Sexual selection and trust games by Stirrat, Michael
SEXUAL SELECTION AND TRUST GAMES
Michael Stirrat
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews
2010
Full metadata for this item is available in
Research@StAndrews:FullText
at:
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1014
This item is protected by original copyright
 
 
 
SEXUAL SELECTION  
AND TRUST GAMES  
 
 
MICHAEL STIRRAT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in September 2009
P a g e  | i 
I, Michael Stirrat, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 37, 000 
words in length, has been written by me, that is the record of work carried out by me 
and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.  
Date: 
Signature of Candidate: 
I was admitted as a research student in September 2006 and as a candidate for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in September 2006; the higher study for which this is 
a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2006 and 2009. 
Date: 
Signature of Candidate: 
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and 
Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of 
St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for 
that degree.  
Date: 
Signature of Supervisor: 
In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews we understand that we are 
giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the 
regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any 
copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. We also understand that 
the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made 
and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be 
electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an 
embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis 
into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. We 
have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order 
to allow such access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo 
below. 
The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the 
electronic publication of this thesis: 
Embargo on both, all, or part of printed copy and electronic copy for the same fixed 
period of three (3) years on the following ground: 
Publication would preclude future publication. 
Date:     
Signature of Candidate:    Signature of Supervisor: 
P a g e  | ii 
Acknowledgments 
 
The work presented here would not have been possible without my supervisor, David 
Perrett, who has tirelessly worked with me, directing me toward good ideas and away from 
bad ideas and sometimes even putting ideas in my head that I only afterwards realised were 
his (generously donated). Nor would this work have been possible without the support and 
invaluable assistance of friends and colleagues (past and present) in the Perception Lab: 
Jamie F. Lawson, Miriam Law Smith, Elisabeth Cornwell, Ian Stephen, Johannes Schindelin, 
Janek Lobmaier, Tamsin Saxton, and Vinet Coetzee.  
Specific thanks must go to my examiners, Lisa DeBruine and Sue Healy, for taking the time 
and making the effort of actually reading my thesis.  
Further thanks to Bernard Tiddeman for the technical gizmos (Psychomorph), and to Lesley 
Ferrier for everything in the lab. Thank you to anyone who played a game, had their photo 
taken, or filled in obtrusive personal questionnaires in the name of science.  
Thanks also, not least, to Olga Zubko for data gathering and for the big idea.  
Finally, thank you to all those, but particularly my kind and generous wife Anna Bobak and 
my forbearing sister Sarah Rodriguez, for listening to me talk endlessly about psychology, 
sex, evolution, and trust. 
 
 
This work was supported by an EPSRC Doctoral Training Grant 
P a g e  | iii 
Note to the reader: 
Throughout the experimental chapters in this thesis, I have used the pronoun ‘we’ 
instead of ‘I’. This work is my own in terms of hypotheses, analyses and conclusions, 
however, the Perception Lab is an inherently collaborative environment and all 
members assist in the running of participants, the taking of photographs, the setting 
up of software and experiments, the pooling of questions and data and the 
exchanging of ideas. Such collaborative effort must be acknowledged. The plural 
pronoun reflects the fact that, if published, the following experiments would carry 
multiple authorship and is used in keeping with intellectual honesty. 
P a g e  | iv 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgments ____________________________________________________ ii 
Note to the reader: ___________________________________________________ iii 
Table of Contents ____________________________________________________ iv 
Table of Figures _____________________________________________________ vii 
Abstract: ___________________________________________________________ ix 
Section 1  Trustworthiness and Faces _____________________________________ 1 
Chapter 1 Evolutionary Sources of Trustworthiness ______________________ 2 
Cooperation in economic games _____________________________________________ 5 
Kin ____________________________________________________________________ 13 
Reciprocity _____________________________________________________________ 13 
Sexual selection _________________________________________________________ 15 
Chapter 2 Faces __________________________________________________ 24 
Personality _____________________________________________________________ 27 
Perceived Trustworthiness _________________________________________________ 30 
Why Trust Attractive People? ______________________________________________ 40 
Chapter 3 Attractiveness and Trust __________________________________ 41 
Experiment 1 – Perceived Health and Trust ___________________________________ 46 
Images ______________________________________________________________________ 46 
Participants __________________________________________________________________ 46 
Procedure ___________________________________________________________________ 46 
Results ______________________________________________________________________ 47 
Female images _____________________________________________________________ 48 
Male images _______________________________________________________________ 48 
Experiment 2 – Perceived Trustworthiness and Trust ___________________________ 49 
Images ______________________________________________________________________ 49 
Participants __________________________________________________________________ 49 
Procedure ___________________________________________________________________ 50 
Results ______________________________________________________________________ 50 
Female images _____________________________________________________________ 51 
Male images _______________________________________________________________ 52 
Discussion ______________________________________________________________ 52 
Perceived Health is Trusted, Femininity is ‘Trusted’ __________________________________ 54 
Section 1 Summary: __________________________________________________ 56 
Section 2 Sexual Selection: Male Display and Female Choice _________________ 57 
Chapter 4 Male Display in Trust Games _______________________________ 58 
Experiment: Trust Game (Male Display) ______________________________________ 64 
Participants __________________________________________________________________ 64 
Images ______________________________________________________________________ 64 
Experiment Procedure _________________________________________________________ 65 
P a g e  | v 
Self-rating ___________________________________________________________________ 66 
Analysis _____________________________________________________________________ 66 
Results ______________________________________________________________________ 66 
Player one: Trust decisions ___________________________________________________ 67 
Player two: Reciprocation ____________________________________________________ 69 
Discussion: Men ‘Display’ Trust _____________________________________________ 71 
Chapter 5 Female choice in Trust Games ______________________________ 76 
Experiment: Trust Games (Female Choice) ____________________________________ 80 
Participants __________________________________________________________________ 80 
Images ______________________________________________________________________ 80 
Experiment Procedure _________________________________________________________ 80 
Analysis _____________________________________________________________________ 80 
Results ______________________________________________________________________ 81 
Player one: Trust decisions ___________________________________________________ 81 
Player two: Reciprocation ____________________________________________________ 82 
Discussion: Women Exploit the Trust of Attractive Men _________________________ 83 
Chapter 6 Food sharing and sex _____________________________________ 86 
Self-evaluation and market value _________________________________________________ 88 
Experiment: Payment Preferences on Dates __________________________________ 91 
Participants __________________________________________________________________ 91 
Procedure ___________________________________________________________________ 91 
Stimuli ______________________________________________________________________ 92 
Analysis _____________________________________________________________________ 92 
Results ______________________________________________________________________ 93 
Self-Rated attractiveness and payment __________________________________________ 94 
Image attractiveness and payment _____________________________________________ 94 
Attractiveness interactions ___________________________________________________ 95 
Discussion: Preferences Predicted by Mating Market ___________________________ 97 
Section 2 Summary: _________________________________________________ 101 
Section 3  Competition and Sexual Selection _____________________________ 102 
Chapter 7 Testosterone and Trust Games ____________________________ 103 
Experiment 1: Testosterone and Trust (St Andrews Images) _____________________ 109 
Stage 1 – Images and Hormones ________________________________________________ 109 
The Hormone Assay: _______________________________________________________ 109 
Stage 2 – Attractiveness _______________________________________________________ 110 
Stage 3 – Trust game __________________________________________________________ 111 
Experiment 1: Results _________________________________________________________ 112 
Male Faces: _______________________________________________________________ 112 
Female Faces: _____________________________________________________________ 115 
Experiment 2: Testosterone and Trust (Aberdeen Images) ______________________ 118 
Stage 1 – Images and Hormones ________________________________________________ 118 
Photography: _____________________________________________________________ 119 
The Hormone Assay: _______________________________________________________ 119 
Stage 2 – Attractiveness _______________________________________________________ 119 
Stage 3 – Trust game __________________________________________________________ 120 
Experiment 2: Results _________________________________________________________ 121 
Discussion _____________________________________________________________ 124 
Discussion: Testosterone Cues Less Trust but More Reciprocation ______________________ 126 
P a g e  | vi 
Chapter 8 Male Facial Width and Trustworthiness _____________________ 128 
Experiment 1 – Male Trust and Reciprocation ________________________________ 132 
Participants _________________________________________________________________ 132 
Stimuli _____________________________________________________________________ 133 
Procedure: Trust game ________________________________________________________ 133 
Facial Measure ______________________________________________________________ 134 
Analysis ____________________________________________________________________ 135 
Results and Discussion ________________________________________________________ 135 
Experiment 2 – Perceived Trustworthiness ___________________________________ 136 
Participants _________________________________________________________________ 136 
Stimuli _____________________________________________________________________ 136 
Procedure: Trust game ________________________________________________________ 136 
Analysis ____________________________________________________________________ 136 
Results and Discussion ________________________________________________________ 137 
Experiment 3 – Manipulation of Facial Images ________________________________ 138 
Participants _________________________________________________________________ 138 
Stimuli _____________________________________________________________________ 138 
Procedure __________________________________________________________________ 139 
Analysis ____________________________________________________________________ 140 
Results and Discussion ________________________________________________________ 140 
General Discussion ______________________________________________________ 141 
Section 3 Summary __________________________________________________ 144 
Chapter 9 Conclusion _____________________________________________ 145 
References ________________________________________________________ 153 
Appendix 1 ________________________________________________________ 164 
Appendix 2 ________________________________________________________ 165 
 
 
P a g e  | vii 
Table of Figures 
 
Figure 1-1 - Decision tree and payoff matrix for Trust Game: Player one (P1) has a binary choice between 
ending the game and trusting Player two (P2). P2 has a binary choice between honouring or exploiting trust. 
The monetary payoffs are explicit in the tree.   .......................................................................................................... 9
Figure 3-1 – All rated parameters correlated with trust decisions.  Perceived health showed only independent 
contribution to regression model.   ........................................................................................................................... 48
Figure 4-1 – Male players ‘trust’ females and ‘reciprocate’ with males. Male players trusted female 
counterparts more often and reciprocated with male counterparts more often.   ................................................... 67
Figure 4-2 – Sex, facial attractiveness and proportion of trust judgements. Players trusted attractive more often 
than unattractive images (ANOVA: F1,24 = 30.2, p < .0005) and female more often than male images (ANOVA: 
F1,24 = 4.4, p = .046). Players’ trust was also more affected by female attractiveness than by male attractiveness 
(ANOVA: F1,24 = 5.4, p = .03).   ................................................................................................................................ 68
Figure 4-3 – The effect of self-reported dominance on proportion of faces trusted. Less dominant males were 
more affected by female than male attractiveness (F1,9 = 10.6, p = 0.01) whereas more dominant males were not 
more affected by female attractiveness (F1,15 = 0.04, p = 0.95).   ............................................................................. 69
Figure 4-4 - Effects of sex and facial attractiveness on proportion of reciprocation judgements. Players 
reciprocated more often with more attractive counterparts (ANOVA: F1,24 = 11.0, p < .005) but an interaction 
with sex of image showed this to be driven by female attractiveness (ANOVA: F1,24 = 13.2 p < .005). 
Additionally, male participants showed a preference to reciprocate with male rather than female counterparts 
(ANOVA: F1,24 = 10.5 p = .004).   ............................................................................................................................. 70
Figure 4-5 – The effect of self-reported dominance on proportion of faces shown reciprocation. Less dominant 
males showed a greater preference for reciprocation with male images (ANOVA: F1,24 = 4.7 p = .04).   .............. 71
Figure 5-1 - Participants trust attractive faces. Participants trust attractive faces but show neither significant 
sex preference nor any sex dependant response to attractiveness.   ........................................................................ 82
Figure 5-2 - Participants exploit trust from attractive males but not from attractive females Women reciprocate 
more with female counterparts and with more attractive counterparts. However, this is qualified by an 
interaction. Male attractiveness elicits less reciprocation.   ..................................................................................... 83
Figure 6-1 – Stimuli images ordered left to right for attractiveness.   ..................................................................... 92
Figure 6-2 - Sex difference in payment preference for ‘dinner dates.’ Females show a stronger preference than 
males for the opposite sex to pay for the meal.   ....................................................................................................... 94
Figure 6-3 – Self-rated attractiveness predicts a shift in preference of both sexes toward the opposite sex paying 
for the meal. Both male and female participants are more likely to prefer the opposite sex to pay for the meal if 
they consider themselves to be attractive.   ............................................................................................................... 96
Figure 6-4 – Male participants offer to pay for attractive females; female participants prefer to be paid for by 
attractive males. There is a significant effect of facial attractiveness on the payment preferences of both male 
and female participants but in opposite directions.   ................................................................................................ 97
Figure 7-1: Male faces, trust condition.   ............................................................................................................... 113
Figure 7-2 – Participants’ response to lower testosterone male faces was significantly more trusting than their 
response to higher testosterone male faces (t = -3.08, df. = 62, p = .003) and participants reciprocated less 
frequently with low testosterone male faces than with high testosterone male faces (t = 3.49, df. = 62, p = .001)
  ............................................................................................................................................................................... 114
Figure 7-3: Male faces, reciprocation condition.   ................................................................................................. 114
Figure 7-4: Female faces, trust condition.   ........................................................................................................... 116
Figure 7-5 – Participants’ response to lower testosterone female faces was significantly more trusting than their 
response to higher testosterone female faces (t = -4.46, df. = 62, p < .0005) and participants reciprocated less 
frequently with low testosterone female faces than with high testosterone female faces (t = 2.09, df. = 62, p = 
.04)   ......................................................................................................................................................................... 117
Figure 7-6: Female faces, reciprocation condition.   ............................................................................................. 117
Figure 7-7: Female faces, trust condition.   ........................................................................................................... 123
Figure 7-8 – Participants showed no significant difference in trust toward high vs. low testosterone faces. 
However, response to higher testosterone faces was significantly more reciprocating than their response to 
lower testosterone faces. (t = -4.96, df. = 51, p < .0005)   ....................................................................................... 124
Figure 7-9: Female faces, reciprocation condition.   ............................................................................................. 124
Figure 8-1 – Bizygomatic width and upper face height calculated from 2-D images. All measured images were 
aligned and scaled to the same horizontally level eye points. Bizygomatic width was calculated as the maximum 
horizontal distance from left facial boundary to right facial boundary. Upper face height was calculated as the 
vertical distance from the higher point of the upper lip to the highest point of the eyelids. Facial width ratio was 
calculated as width/height.  .................................................................................................................................... 134
Figure 8-2 – Male facial width ratio predicts the proportion of participants that trust images.   ......................... 137
Figure 8-3 – Example of high ratio (right) and low ratio (left) transformed image.   .......................................... 139
 
 
 
P a g e  | viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"there is some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements 
of the serpent and the wolf." (Hume, 1898) 
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Abstract: 
In economic games the facial attributes of counterparts bias decisions to trust and 
decisions to enter play. We report research supporting hypotheses that trust and 
reciprocation decisions in trust games are biased by mechanisms of sexual selection.  
Hypotheses that trust game behaviour is modulated by inter-sexual competition 
were supported. 1) Attractive individuals elicit more cooperation. 2) Male 
participants display trust and reciprocation toward attractive female counterparts in 
excess of perceived trustworthiness (and this display is modulated by male self-
reported physical dominance). 3) Female participants appear to respond to male 
trust as a signal of sexual interest and are therefore more likely to exploit the trust of 
attractive males. 4) In explicitly dating contexts females are more likely to prefer 
attractive males to pay for the meal. These results indicate that participants are 
biased by mate choice and mating display considerations while playing economic 
games in the lab. Hypotheses that trust game behaviour is modulated by intra-sexual 
competition for resources were also somewhat supported. 1) Male participants 
reporting an ability to win fights with same-sex peers are more exploitative of other 
males. 2) Cues to current circulating testosterone level in counterpart’s faces are less 
trusted but elicit more reciprocation. 3) The male sexually dimorphic trait facial 
width-to-height ratio (a trait which is related to both aggression and dominance) is 
related to an increased proportion of decisions to exploit others in the trust game 
while also being used by others as a cue to untrustworthiness. We conclude that 
trusting and trustworthy behaviour in both sexes is biased by mating market 
considerations predicted by intra- and inter-sexual selection
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Section 1 
 
Trustworthiness and Faces 
Common sense tells us that we can judge the credibility and honesty of others from 
their demeanour and appearance. This is a view so commonly and clearly held that a 
study of Canadian court judges showed that they rely on common sense beliefs 
about the relationship between appearance, demeanour and credibility and may 
well have made incorrect court judgements upon this basis (Porte & ten Brinke, 
2009). It is clearly important that we gain an understanding of how appearances bias 
decisions with regard to perceived trustworthiness. In this first section we will 
explore why humans are ever trustworthy, what information we can read from 
faces, and why attractive faces are trusted more. 
Chapter 1. Trustworthiness has multiple evolutionary sources, one source is the 
cooperation required over reproduction leading to partner choosiness and costly 
signalling.  
Chapter 2: Faces are rich sources of social information about personality and identity 
and as such may allow reliable and valid trust judgements. 
Chapter 3: Attractiveness in the form of perceived health is trusted as a ‘halo’ but 
female attractiveness in the form of facial femininity elicits ‘trust’ unrelated to 
perceived trustworthiness. This may make sense in light of sexual selection for 
female fertility. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Evolutionary Sources of Trustworthiness 
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It is easy to wax lyrical about trust and co-operation. Dawkins, that proponent of 
naked Darwinism and the ‘selfish gene’ does. He sees human society as “a delicate 
gossamer structure of trust and co-operation and, well, just plain niceness. Because I 
know and understand Darwinism, I see the threat lurking there just below the 
surface, ready to pull us down again.” (quoted in Kohn, 2004, p. 323) 
Without that “delicate gossamer structure” of trust social life would become a 
Hobbesian war of all against all; nature red in tooth and claw. Thomas Hobbes’ 
solution to lack of trust was an authoritarian state with the sole legitimate use of 
force (Hobbes, 1651). This state would enforce social contracts and as a 
consequence trust would be underwritten because any defaulter upon legal 
agreement would have punishment meted out by the state. Hobbes’ prescription of 
an absolute monarchy to solve the problem of cooperation and trust may not be a 
political pill that would be acceptable to swallow today but his writing on this point is 
perhaps the first statement of cooperation as a theoretical problem. It is because of 
this that it has tremendous value as a starting point. 
Trust and cooperation and how they are implemented in social relationships or in 
the ‘community’ are regularly bruited by politicians. Lack of trust in politicians is a 
constant topic in the media and over many pints of beer the world over. Parents face 
very difficult choices of trust when they hand over their children at the school gate 
into the hands of people they hardly know. As consumers we place trust constantly 
in the standards of hygiene in restaurants, in the competence and motivation of the 
mechanics that repair our cars. Oddly, we are regularly willing to pay for services in 
advance trusting to receive services paid for; by doing this we wittingly give incentive 
P a g e  | 4 
not to carry out the service we have already paid for and it is exactly this kind of 
incentive that Hobbes sought to counterbalance with government threat of force. 
In popular media the books The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins (2006) and The 
Origins of Virtue by Matt Ridley (1996) cover most of the evolutionary bases of 
cooperative human nature. Given that the history of life is a history of natural 
selection, co-operation needs to be explained. Ridley notes that any animal 
behaviour is of necessity an evolved behaviour. The behaviour that exists is 
therefore most likely to be behaviour that has benefited its own replication. Rather 
than the behaviour benefiting itself, however, we should keep in mind an insight 
gained in evolutionary theory in making the distinction between replicators and 
vehicles (See Dawkins, 1982); any variation in behaviour between individuals 
(vehicles) that produces differential reproductive benefits for the source of that 
behaviour (replicators – e.g. genes) is behaviour that will be subject to selection 
(because the replicators will increase in number). To give an example, where there 
are genetic variations that produce differences in male mating displays, those genes 
that produce the most effective mating displays are the ones that will reproduce; it is 
the source of the behaviour that sees reproductive benefit. We should therefore 
always keep in mind when observing a cooperative behaviour the legal phrase cui 
bono? in English who or what benefits? 
The common misunderstanding of Dawkins’ metaphor of the The Selfish Gene (2006) 
is that this means the selfish individual. While Dawkins’ metaphor may positively 
invite this misinterpretation this is clearly not what he means nor what would be 
predicted by evolutionary theory. Cooperative behaviours are predicted; their 
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original evolution can be explained by at least three evolutionary processes: (1) kin-
selection (Hamilton, 1964), (2) direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971) or indirect (Nowak & 
Sigmund, 2005), and (3) costly signalling (Grafen, 1990). All three of these 
mechanisms explain behaviour that looks costly for the individual by demonstrating 
how in the longer term the behaviour benefits the individual or their genes. We shall 
consider these three mechanisms but first we shall discuss how cooperation can be 
measured empirically. 
Cooperation in economic games 
Extensive research on co-operation has been carried out in the economic games 
framework. Classical game theory assumes the individual actor is Homo economicus; 
a perfectly rational, self-regarding actor whose only aim is to maximise payoffs. This 
individual will always be broadly self-interested and will maximise any payoff in an 
broadly defined economic context. This would not mean that individuals will never 
act to benefit others as there will be contexts of mutual self-interest as Robert 
Wright (2001) recently put it “among the many reasons I don’t think we should 
bomb the Japanese is that they built my minivan.” The source of co-operation in this 
framework is mutual self-interest, reciprocation. 
The paradigmatic economic game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The name of this game 
comes from the way it has been conceived and is normally introduced but the 
structure of the game appears in multiple co-operative and competitive contexts.  
The Chicago District Attorney (DA) knows that two gangsters, let’s call them A and B, 
are guilty of a serious crime but can only convict them if one or both of them 
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confesses. The DA picks them on a relatively minor charge and separately offers each 
of them a deal: 
• If you confess and your accomplice does not, you go free (he goes to jail). 
• If he confesses and you do not, you will get the maximum jail time (10 years). 
• If you both confess, you will go to jail but the maximum sentence won’t be 
applied (2 years). 
• If neither of you confess, you will go to jail on a tax evasion charge – minimum 
jail time (0.5 years). 
 
Players in this game get to choose how to treat the other guy, whether to rat on him 
(defect) or to keep their mouth zipped (cooperate). It will, however, always be self-
interestedly rational to defect as can be seen from the years of jail time payoffs in 
Table 1-1. Homo Economicus would adopt a utility maximising strategy. With this 
assumption neither A nor B have any motivation to adopt the ‘Don’t confess’ 
strategy. Consider B’s options: if A chooses ‘Don’t confess’ then B should choose to 
‘Confess’ as this would reduce his six month sentence to zero, on the other hand if A 
chooses ‘Confess’ then it is still best for B to choose ‘Don’t confess’ as two years is 
considerably less than 10. This situation is true for both A and B and they both also 
know that their counterpart will be able to reason the same way which provides 
even more motivation to switch strategies to avoid 10 years in prison.  
John Maynard Smith (1982) has defined an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) such as 
this one to be the best reply to itself that is a better reply to any alternative best 
reply than the alternative best reply is to itself. If this was easily understood we 
could dispense with the unpacking of the prisoner’s dilemma above. 
The upshot of this hyper-rational behaviour – finding the best reply to any other 
strategy – is that although the prisoners might co-operate to get only six months jail-
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time they inevitably end up with two years each. The logic appears inescapable and 
suggests that organising co-operation and trust is impossible in this situation. 
Table 1-1 - Prisoner's Dilemma Payoffs 
 
  Prisoner A’s strategies 
  Don’t confess Confess 
Prisoner 
B’s 
strategies 
Don’t confess (A) 0.5 yrs (B) 0.5 yrs 
(A) 0 yrs 
(B) 10 yrs 
Confess (A) 10 yrs (B) 0 yrs 
(A) 2 yrs 
(B) 2 yrs 
 
In fact this logic is inescapable as long as the analytic assumptions hold that the 
players are consistent in behaviour, correctly understand the payoffs, and that the 
actual payoffs for the game are Prisoner’s Dilemma payoffs. If the DA lies to the 
prisoners, some local mafia boss threatens the prisoners or the prisoners have a long 
term relationship of loyalty and reputation then the payoffs of the game are 
different from the payoffs of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. To put this more simply, 
the prisoners are not playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and we should expect 
different behaviour. We must therefore be very careful in analysing game payoffs. 
There is a similar game that can be used to measure trust and reciprocation rather 
than cooperation, this is the Trust Game. Originally popularised by Berg et al (1995) 
as the ‘investment game’ rather than making simultaneous moves as in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, the second mover responds to the first mover.  
The Trust Game is illustrated in Figure 1-1. In this version of the game all participants 
are given £3 at the start. Player 1 has a straight choice between whether to keep the 
£3 or entrust it over to player 2. An increment of £2 is applied to any entrusted 
money, increasing the total endowment to £8. Player 2 then has a choice to exploit 
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that trust and take an unfair proportion of the money (£6) or honour player 1’s trust 
with a fair split of £4 each. As with the prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation can benefit 
both players, in the Trust Game due to the increment, but player 2 can benefit more 
by defecting and taking an unfair share. Self-interest would therefore dictate that 
the player 2 would always cheat; due to this, rational self-interest would also dictate 
that player 1 should never trust. 
The original version of the game allowed the first player to entrust the second player 
with any amount – including none – of the original endowment and the second 
player to return any amount of this final endowment. The binary version of the trust 
game we present here is simpler to interpret (Huck, Ruchala, & Tyran, 2007) as the 
choice is to trust or not to trust, to reciprocate or not to reciprocate and has been 
used and validated by various researchers as a measure of trust and reciprocity (c.f. 
Debruine, 2002; Fehr, Fischbacher, Schupp, Rosenbladt, & Wagner, 2003a; Glaeser, 
Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 
2005). This is the game that we have used to measure trust and reciprocity 
throughout the empirical reports that follow. 
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Figure 1-1 - Decision tree and payoff matrix for Trust Game: Player one (P1) has a binary choice 
between ending the game and trusting Player two (P2). P2 has a binary choice between honouring or 
exploiting trust. The monetary payoffs are explicit in the tree. 
 
The typical behaviour of players in economic games including Prisoner’s Dilemma 
and Trust Games is very far from the prediction of Homo economicus. Players choose 
to co-operate 50% of the time in Prisoner’s Dilemma (Camerer, 2003), and if they get 
to communicate with their fellow ‘prisoner’ prior to the game this increases (Dawes, 
1980). Participants in the various other experimental games show similar levels of 
co-operation and non-rational lack of self-interest. It is clear that either Homo 
sapiens is not also Homo economicus (See Henrich et al., 2004 for extended 
discussions) or players are playing different games from those set in the lab.  
We can use this binary version of the Trust Game to illustrate one reason why 
predictions from the assumption of Homo economicus do not match with the way 
people actually play games. Whenever these games are played the assumption that 
the only payoffs are the monetary ones is not sustained. We can hold on to the 
assumption that players are self-interested when making decisions whether to be 
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trustworthy or not if we consider additional costs/benefits in the payoff matrix 
(Table 1-2) for being untrustworthy (Q) such as a feeling of anxiety at possible loss of 
reputation or pleasure at ‘getting one over’ on your acquaintance, and possible 
additional costs/benefits to being trustworthy (P) such as a ‘warm glow’ from feeling 
good about your actions or irritation at feeling taken advantage of. Also, when 
making decisions about whom to trust we may factor in other criteria (X and Y). We 
may trust others in order to convey respect, or honour, or that we like them in order 
to elicit some response; for example we might show trust to a problematic 
adolescent in order to provoke responsible behaviour even although we fully expect 
them to exploit our trust. On the other hand we may mistrust someone – or merely 
want to have nothing to do with them – in order to spite them rather than because 
we actually think they will exploit our trust. These additional factors (P, Q, X, and Y) 
are external to what happens in the lab and may explain some proportion of 
participant behaviour. With these additional payoffs the game participants are 
playing is not the Trust Game and we should therefore not be surprised when 
players are trusting or honour trust. 
Table 1-2 – Trust Game payoff matrix. Player one (P1) has a binary choice between ending the game 
and trusting Player two (P2). P2 has a binary choice between honouring or exploiting trust. The 
monetary payoffs are explicit in the matrix but participants make decisions including extra payoff 
parameters, X and Y for trust decisions and P and Q for reciprocation decisions. 
The Trust Game 
Payoff Matrix 
        P1                                   
 
P2 
Trust Don't Trust 
Honour 
Trust 
        £4+X                                  
£4+P 
£3+Y                        
£3 
Exploit 
Trust 
        £2+X                                  
£6+Q 
£3+Y              
£3 
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These other payoffs, however, require that participants believe that their actions will 
have consequences outside of the lab, i.e. we know our game counterparts or they 
know who we are. When these games are run it is therefore normal to control 
information completely so that participants are anonymous and are free to make 
choices without any social consequences but even then participants are honest and 
cooperative. A possible explanation why participants remain honest when 
unobserved is that they believe themselves to be observed. Indeed, priming 
participants with ‘ghost stories’ of a dead researcher who used to work in the lab 
and was interested in the outcome of experiments increased honesty in competitive 
lab experiments (Bering, McLeod, & Shackelford, 2006) or merely placing eyespots 
on the computer desktop background can increase cooperation in economic games 
(Haley & Fessler, 2005). Even placing a poster with eyes on it behind an honesty box 
increases the amount of money contributed (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006). 
These studies indicate that even although all natural information is controlled, we 
still feel Big Brother watching us and behave to conserve our reputations. It has been 
suggested from facts like these that modelling fiction of Homo economicus might be 
abandoned in favour of the fiction of Homo behavioralis (Binmore, 1994). Where 
Homo economicus has preferences – albeit, evolved preferences – and decides how 
to act based upon those preferences the fiction of Homo behavioralis responds 
purely instinctively to stimuli and therefore behaviour is moulded directly by nature. 
A more careful analysis of game payoffs is only one way of rehabilitating Homo 
economicus. People do not appear to behave in accord with the selfish rational actor 
model but the assumption of rationality can be moderated with what has come to be 
called bounded rationality (and see Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; Simon, 1957, 1990); 
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this idea is that people are seldom aware of all the facts nor are they often able to 
deduce all the consequences and that it is these bounds on rationality that correctly 
explains the failure of individuals to behave in the fully rational expected manner. 
Under these assumptions the maximisation of utility is replaced with satisficing and 
the elegance and predictive power of game theory is retained. The position is well 
summarised by Kahneman (2003): 
“Economists often criticize psychological research for its propensity to 
generate lists of errors and biases, and for its failure to offer a coherent 
alternative to the rational-agent model. This complaint is only partly justified: 
psychological theories of intuitive thinking cannot match the elegance and 
precision of formal normative models of belief and choice, but this is just 
another way of saying that rational models are psychologically unrealistic.”  
An effect of this perspective is to push the level of decision making down from the 
individual’s preferences toward adapted responses, either adapted in the weak 
sense of learned behaviour or in the strong sense of evolved psychological 
mechanisms (Homo behavioralis). The lack of realism present in Homo economicus 
may be due to the assumption that the source of cooperative behaviour is individual 
choice and that this choice is toward the end of benefiting the individual. Bounded 
rationality recognises that the source of behaviour may be elsewhere than individual 
choice.  
Thinking about the evolution of the human species allows us to ask questions and 
hypothesise about both Homo behavioralis and the evolved preferences of Homo 
economicus. We shall, therefore, consider the sources of behaviour that underlie and 
bias cooperative decisions in the next section. It is however, worth noting here that 
heuristics of cooperative behaviour – unlike cooperation based on mutual self-
interest – may in the end be indistinguishable from altruistic self-sacrifice. 
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Kin 
First, a source of cooperation is kin selection (Hamilton, 1964). This is the reason that 
adults care for offspring, that ants sacrifice themselves for the colony and why as 
J.B.S. Haldane wryly observed: "I would lay down my life for two brothers or eight 
cousins." How does this work? 
Animal behaviour has its source largely with the genes. Genes that predispose an 
animal to benefit its kin – those other animals that share the same genes – are genes 
that are likely to replicate more often than genes that don’t do this. With other 
things being equal, parent animals that pay costs to benefit their offspring are more 
likely to reproduce and have offspring that reproduce than parent animals that do 
not do this. In the same way, but to a lesser degree, siblings that pay costs to benefit 
their sibs are more likely to have genes represented in the next generation. As 
Haldane observed, cousins are less related – the genetic relatedness of cousins being 
a quarter that of sibs – the same is true, more weakly, of behaviour toward cousins. 
In the context of economic games and face perception there is evidence that we 
humans do exactly this in being more likely to cooperate with counterparts who look 
like kin in showing more trust to self-similar faces (Debruine, 2002) and contributing 
more in multiplayer economic games where some of the counterparts look self-
similar (Krupp, Debruine, & Barclay, 2008). 
Reciprocity 
The prisoner’s dilemma has a cooperative solution that relates to a second source of 
cooperation, reciprocity. As previously discussed the selfish rational utility 
maximising game player will always defect in the prisoner’s dilemma. However, this 
is only the case if the player knows that this is the only game to be played, in the 
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jargon a one-shot game. If the game is iterated with the same counterpart the payoff 
structure over the longer term alters. The player may reason that it will benefit him 
to play nice and gain the benefits of cooperation with their counterpart for as long as 
the interaction continues. This is the logic of direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971) and is 
nicely illustrated in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (Dostoyevsky, 1881), 
particularly in how the solution breaks down. 
Dostoyevsky tells us of a Lieutenant Colonel responsibility for his division’s accounts. 
The Lieutenant Colonel has struck up a relationship with a local businessman, 
Trifonov. Every month the Lieutenant Colonel closes the accounts, takes some 
money and loans it to Trifonov. Trifonov uses this capital to make a little profit and 
returns the money plus a little extra before the Lieutenant Colonel needs to write up 
the books for the next month. The Lieutenant Colonel trusts Trifonov to return the 
capital and Trifonov does so without fail. It quickly becomes apparent, however, that 
Trifonov is only trustworthy because he enjoys the benefits of the regular loans. The 
Lieutenant Colonel is suddenly posted and has to reclaim the outstanding capital 
quickly. Trifonov recognises that the relationship is at an end and responds with “I’ve 
never received any money from you, and couldn’t possibly have received any.” 
When participants in the lab play iterated economic games the manner in which 
players start to stop cooperating is precisely in line with Trifonov’s reaction and how 
close the participants recognise they are to the interaction ending (Dixit & Skeath, 
2004; Roth, 1995). 
There is a complication to this in our highly networked human interactions. Trifonov 
could only behave like he did because the relationship was somewhat clandestine. If 
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the financial relationship had been public and possible future financial partners 
would have access to information about Trifonov’s behaviour he may have behaved 
quite differently. In any highly networked group we can expect that reputation will 
start to matter as counterparts may play with us according to how they have heard 
we played with someone else. This is indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). 
Again, reputation in economic games is important. When making economic game 
play decisions players are sensitive to information about how individuals have played 
previously (Huck, et al., 2007). Indeed, as previously mentioned, eyespots on the 
computer desktop background can increase cooperation in economic games (Haley 
& Fessler, 2005),  
The idea of reputation leads on to the third evolutionary mechanism that may 
produce cooperation, costly signalling (Grafen, 1990).  
Sexual selection 
One area where cooperation, reciprocity or ‘interchange’ is absolutely required is in 
mating. Males and females must negotiate an interchange of sex gametes and care 
of offspring in such a way that the offspring come to term and survive to reproduce 
themselves. Individuals attempt to trade their various capacities of parental 
investment for other commodities and this leads to complex market problems of 
partner choice, advertising and the costs of recognising free riders. 
Market effects influence the formation and development of mating relationships 
because there is intense competition over being chosen as a partner. The role of 
partner choice on the evolution of traits related to cooperation has been explained 
generally by biological market theory, demonstrating that partner choice can drive 
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organisms to adapt traits that that honestly signal an increase in their value as a 
cooperative partner (Noë & Hammerstein, 1994, 1995). In humans, males and 
females form long-term monogamous bonds and must select appropriate partners 
to develop such bonds with. Competition over partners in humans is strong, and 
therefore humans should be adapted to display traits that increase their ability to be 
chosen as a partner. Traits that could influence partner selection include access to 
resources, the disposition to provide resources and physical attractiveness (Buss, 
2003).  
There are sexual asymmetries to the reproductive costs of males and females, where 
the sex with the larger gametes (biologically defined as female) makes more 
physiological investment in their offspring. There is further asymmetry of investment 
in mammals since post-natally females provide nourishment to offspring through 
milk.  This asymmetrical pattern of metabolic investment predicts that females will 
be choosier with partners and that males should seek as many mates as possible 
(Darwin, 1871; Kappeler & van Schaik, 2004; Trivers, 1972). This is because 
reproductive opportunity is physiologically cheaper for males than females. A male 
can inseminate numerous females with little physical cost, while a female can bear 
only single offspring at a time and incurs a large cost for each. Consequently, poor 
mate choices are more costly to a female’s reproductive success, whereas males 
have much to gain and little to lose reproductively by obtaining many mating 
opportunities. 
In humans, offspring also require extensive care before reaching sexual maturity, 
and so there is a very high demand on the female to care for her offspring. This 
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creates the need by the female to form a mate-bonded relationship with a male that 
can assist in providing resources and care to the infant. Consequently, females 
should have a selective bias towards males that can provide resources and support 
to her and her offspring, and this is provides a selective pressure towards monogamy 
(Kappeler & van Schaik, 2004). This generates a biological market based on sexual 
selection, where females prefer males that have traits that increase their ability to 
acquire resources and defend them. Consequently, when given a choice of different 
males, females will select the male that can best provide resources, creating a 
directional selective force towards traits related to resource holding potential. Males 
are forced to compete with other males by providing more and more resources in 
order to be chosen over other males by a female for a long-term mate. Here partner 
choice drives the evolution of the system. Since human offspring require high levels 
of care before reaching sexual maturity, males that can successfully provide the care 
and thus form long-term relationships with willing females will produce more viable 
offspring and will reproduce better than their other male competitors. 
Sexual selection theory provides a framework for understanding the sex differences 
in human mate choice preferences. While men and women generally report the 
same desired characteristics in a long-term partner, they differ in what they consider 
to be most important (Buss, 1989). Men generally consider female attractiveness to 
be a necessity and resources to be a luxury whereas women more often consider 
male resources to be a necessity and male attractiveness to be a luxury (Li, Bailey, 
Kenrick, & Linsenmeier, 2002). Overall, human male courtship should involve the 
giving of resources, as signs of generosity, in order to out compete other potential 
mates of the female the male is courting (Miller, 2007). One example of such 
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advertising or ‘showing off’ among adult males is that men are more likely to make 
more generous donations to charity when observed by an attractive woman (Iredale, 
Van Vugt, & Dunbar, 2008). Males also show a disposition to provision females that 
are more likely to be sexually active and fertile. For example, males give greater 
amounts of money to females in the fertile phase of their menstrual cycle than to 
other females in lap-dancing establishments (Miller, Tybur, & Jordan, 2007). 
If female choice between males, however, were simply a matter of choosing the 
male who showed greatest willingness and ability to invest in them and their 
offspring, this run-away selection pressure would produce resource-seeking males 
dedicated to provisioning females with necessary resources. Males who did not do 
this would not gain access to females, and would be out-competed and by their male 
rivals and would not reproduce. Males with the most resources may not have the 
most desirable traits in other characteristic though. Therefore, female choice should 
also attend to other cues that may indicate the male’s heritable qualities.  
As we include other commodities into the market model, such as the need for 
additional resources to raise offspring successfully, trading becomes more complex 
and choices now become trade-offs. Females must decide how to trade-off between 
male dispositions to provide resources and other important fitness-related traits 
depending on their ability to acquire a mate. Females will select partners that can 
offer the best commodities depending on the choosing female’s relative value in the 
mating market. This market model generates the hypothesis that males with good 
genes (i.e., attractive males) will be required to provide fewer resources to gain 
sexual access, and attractive females will demand both attractiveness and additional 
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resources in a partner. Moreover, more attractive females should be more likely to 
test males for their ability to provide both genetic and economic benefits, by 
requesting resources from males they are attracted to.  
A complication upon this mechanism is that individuals will evaluate their own mate 
value relative to others, in order to provide a subjective gauge of their ability to 
attract a romantic partner. A number of studies have shown that both self-perceived 
and other-rated attractiveness relate to one’s ability to obtain romantic dates (De 
Vries, Swenson, & Walsh, 2008; Kurzban & Weeden, 2005; Walster, Aronson, 
Abrahams, & Rottman, 1966; Woll & Young, 1989). Self-perceived attractiveness 
should therefore relate to an individual’s perception of their mate value. Since we 
expect market influences to play a factor in mate selection, one’s assessment of their 
own value should be related to the qualities they demand from a partner (i.e., more 
attractive people will be more demanding of any prospective partner).  
Attractiveness does seem to affect how one determines what qualities one seeks 
from a partner. For example, females with lower waist-to-hip ratios that scored low 
on measures of anxiety, depression and stress showed a higher preference for male 
physical indicators of male health (Jones, Little, et al., 2005). Females with lower 
waist-to-hip ratios and high scores for other measures of attractiveness showed 
preferences for more masculine male faces for long-term relationships (Penton-Voak 
et al., 2003). (We shall return to discuss masculinity as a marker for mate value in 
Chapter 2). Also, self-rated attractiveness in women has been shown to relate to 
preferences for facial masculinity and symmetry (i.e., attractiveness) in their 
partners(Little, Burt, Penton-Voak, & Perrett, 2001). Lastly, one study demonstrated 
P a g e  | 20 
that female self-rated attractiveness was influenced by showing them images of 
either attractive or unattractive females (Little & Mannion, 2006). Females that 
observed images of attractive females downgraded their self-evaluation and those 
who observed unattractive images upgraded their self-evaluation. This effect shows 
clearly how the immediate market conditions might influence a female’s perception 
of her mate value or competitive ability in a market of other females. This effect 
subsequently influenced female preferences for males in a manner showing that 
self-evaluation can influence their preference in a mating market. Females that were 
shown images of more attractive females showed lower preferences for male facial 
masculinity compared with females that were shown less attractive females.   
There is little investigation on male self-perceived attractiveness but in one study, 
according to Little et al. (personal communication), males showed increased 
preference for female facial femininity if they consider themselves to be more 
attractive. It has also been argued that high-quality males are less likely to invest in 
mates and instead pursue a strategy of maximising their number of lifetime mates 
(Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). This is supported in that more physically attractive 
males are more likely to have more short-term sexual relationships than less 
attractive males (Rhodes, Simmons, & Peters, 2005). As with females, it seems the 
self-evaluation of males can influence how they select and invest in female partners 
in a mating market. 
As a consequence of such trades, human romantic relationships seem to be 
influenced by the conditions of a mating market where partners are chosen based on 
P a g e  | 21 
their quality as a partner relative to others in the market (Pawłowski & Dunbar, 
1999). 
In summary of this third mechanism leading to cooperation: Amongst sexual species 
there has to be some aspect of reciprocity in negotiating reproduction. On this basis 
further cooperation may evolve with parents cooperating extensively due to their 
mutual ‘self-interest’ in care of their offspring and partner choice. Where this is the 
case we should expect strong partner choice mechanisms (particularly in females) 
and costly signalling or ‘advertising’ of mate value (particularly in males). We should 
therefore expect such ‘advertising’ to consist in both display of resources but also 
display of generosity and willingness to share those resources (Iredale, et al., 2008; 
Miller, 2007; Miller, et al., 2007). We should also expect trade-offs to be made 
between cooperation and other resources all qualified against what competitors in 
the market offer.  
These three processes demonstrably produce cooperative behaviour and are 
theoretically and empirically sound. Where manipulations under experimental 
conditions to ensure that human participants are not genetically related (excluding 
kin selection) preventing repayment (excluding reciprocity) and ensuring anonymity 
(excluding reputation formation or signalling) people still behave altruistically in 
economic games (e.g. Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003; 
Henrich et al., 2005). This has been labelled ‘Strong Reciprocity’ and (mistakenly) 
been allied with Group Selection evolutionary arguments. Like our desire for sugar 
which is generally a good thing but is automatic and leads us to obesity, or our desire 
for sex being unrelated to whether we are using contraception or not, ‘Strong 
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Reciprocity’ in the laboratory is clearly maladaptive from a biological point of view as 
benefits cannot be accrued to any putative unit of selection, not the gene, not the 
individual and not any group (See Burnham & Johnson, 2005 for discussion). It is 
clear then that humanity has evolved heuristics of co-operation that are not 
introspectively aimed at kin or reputation. Trustworthy behaviour would seem, at 
least in part, automatic.  
Here we have seen that there are sound evolutionary bases for trustworthy and 
cooperative behaviour. There are also, perhaps even more so, sound evolutionary 
bases for selfish behaviour and therefore if we can diagnose the sources of any given 
trusting or trustworthy behaviour we might understand better how it functions and 
encourage it in our lives or in society at large.  
While it is true that any ultimate question of trust must start by looking at the origins 
of trustworthiness; in this thesis I do not wish to deal with the origins of 
trustworthiness generally. Nor do I wish to explore whether predispositions to be 
cooperative are innate, introspective and reciprocating or learned, social and 
categorical [there is evidence for this latter in internalised social norms (Gintis, et al., 
2003) especially from children reporting that it is impossible to break social rules 
(Shtulman & Carey, 2007)]. 
The sources of human trustworthiness are various. Kin selective thinking has 
produced findings that human faces looking self-similar bias cooperative interactions 
as participants appear to favour those that look like kin (Debruine, 2002; Krupp, et 
al., 2008). Following a similar line my focus in this thesis has been on how aspects of 
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face perception, particularly attractiveness, in sexually selective contexts bias or 
alter trust and cooperative relationships.  
The game theory fiction of Homo economicus has been used to predict cooperation 
between actors in many contexts ultimately based in mutual self-interest. It does not 
and can not predict all of the specific contexts where Homo sapiens will be biased. 
For that we need more biologically based thinking. Kin and sexual selection allow us 
to make predictions about human preferences but also to make predictions about 
automatic responses which may be unmediated by individual rationality. It is likely 
that humans respond to stimuli directly in ways that favour the replication of their 
genes without recourse to preferences. 
First, we shall see how well we can read information about the predispositions of 
others from a very rich source of information, the face.
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Chapter 2  
 
Faces 
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Face reading has a very long history and has generated constant interest and 
controversy. The earliest mention of it appears to be in the book Physiognomonica 
which is commonly credited to Aristotle. Amongst many other bizarre ideas – at least 
to the modern reader – the writer of this book suggests that “large and outstanding 
ears” indicate a predisposition to “irrelevant talk,” which is certainly a motivation to 
get those big ears pinned back as soon as possible if you want to be taken seriously. 
More recently ‘physnomye’ was noted as an unlawful practice by statute of Henry 
VIII in 1530 and again banned in 1743 by George II (Stimson, 1910). This was done in 
the context of banning various practices, including palmistry, of the immigrant 
‘Egyptians.’ 
Assessment of character was again made popular in the 18th century by Johann 
Kaspar Lavater (1775-78) and although vigorously attacked by Hegel (1807) 
physiognomy remained a very influential idea, perhaps reaching it’s modern height 
in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Grey (1891) or in various short stories of Edgar 
Allen Poe (Grayson, 2005). This modern incarnation of physiognomy is also 
associated with Franz Joseph Gall through his popularisation of phrenology (Gall, 
1796). 
At various points in the 20th century the idea has been felt to be discredited. Francis 
Galton’s early attempts to make composite faces of criminals found no discernible 
‘types’ and in mainstream science, character has been assumed not to be readily 
discernible in appearances. But even so a survey of American university students in 
1974 revealed that over 90 percent believed faces to be reliable guides to character 
and by 2000 this figure was not much less at over 75 percent (Hassin & Trope, 2000; 
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Liggett, 1974). Most likely as a result of this popular conception of the truth of 
appearances, the 1960 US election race between Nixon and Kennedy is generally 
reported as being swung in Kennedy’s favour by a televised debate where Kennedy 
seemed healthy and relaxed and Nixon pale and sweating. It is a commonly repeated 
story that voters who had listened to the debate on radio thought Nixon had won, 
but that the television audience gave the win to Kennedy (Allen, 2007). 
Such a clear general consensus on this matter that may even decide the outcome of 
US elections which are elections to governance of the biggest economic, military and 
political power there is, it is unarguably important that empirical work demonstrates 
what truth there is to physiognomy and how individuals are swayed by appearance. 
Basic demographic information is clearly displayed in the human face. Human 
subjects are able to make very fast identification of the sex of faces with very high 
accuracy. This result has been replicated in a wide literature – as an example of this 
adult subjects presented with photographs of adults in which hair was concealed by 
a swimming cap performed with 96% accuracy (Burton, Bruce, & Dench, 1993). 
However, this skill must be learned as when presented with facial images masked to 
hide all hair and background information children aged less than 7 years performed 
at just better than chance, children aged around 9 were significantly less accurate 
compared with the near perfect accuracy in young adult subjects aged between 20 
and 29 (Wild et al., 2000). A suggested reason for this is that children may change 
the way they represent faces from a piecemeal to a configural representation 
between ages 6 and 10 (Carey & Diamond, 1977). 
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There is much information about demography or identity in faces but there is also 
information about predispositions to behaviour. 
Personality 
The model of personality used by most researchers focused on the accuracy of social 
perception is the OCEAN or “Big Five” model of personality first proposed by 
(Norman, 1963) and subsequently extensively validated (McCrae & Costa, 1987). The 
five factors in this model have been given a variety of names but the OCEAN 
acronym is a contraction from openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, 
agreeableness and neuroticism. The earliest work using these factors in social 
perception demonstrated that after 15 minutes in the same room with a previously 
unknown individual and without verbal communication participants would rate their 
own extroversion, conscientiousness and openness with significant correlation to the 
other participants’ ratings of them (Passini & Norman, 1966). These results have 
been replicated (e.g. Albright, Kenny, & Malloy, 1988; see Kenny, Albright, Malloy, & 
Kashy, 1994 for review) with extroversion and conscientiousness showing the most 
robust effects.  
In all of the studies mentioned above participants made judgements using rich 
sources of information. Either the individual to be evaluated was present, behind a 
two-way mirror, or presented in high quality video. The effects remain even when 
the information available is reduced to facial information alone. 
In a study using still facial images self-stranger ratings in extroversion, agreeableness 
and emotional stability (neuroticism) showed significant agreement. The 10 raters 
for each trait showed strong reliability for all personality traits with Cronbach’s α>0.7 
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on all parameters except male conscientiousness (α=0.625). For the male faces there 
was significant correlation between self and stranger ratings of extroversion, 
emotional stability and openness whereas only extroversion was significant for the 
female faces (Penton-Voak, Pound, Little, & Perrett, 2006). Although these effect 
sizes were small it remains that there was a significant relationship between 
personality variable perceived in the face and self-reported personality. In a second 
study, for each personality factor, the top and bottom 15 self-rated individuals were 
selected. Composite images were made of these to generate high and low factor 
images. These images were masked to hide hair, clothing and background. All the 
composites high in socially attractive personality characteristic (high openness, 
conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness and low neuroticism) were rated as 
more attractive but on controlling for attractiveness participants judgement were 
still accurate in assigning personality traits for both high and low agreeableness and 
high and low extraversion and additionally for the male faces between the high and 
low neuroticism composites. 
Little and Perrett find very similar results also using composites of individuals who 
had rated themselves high or low on the OCEAN personality factors (Little & Perrett, 
2007). The consensus for observer personality ratings between the 40 raters was 
also high with a Cronbach α>0.7 except for openness (α=0.56) and neuroticism 
(α=0.64). For female faces all factors except for openness showed significant 
accuracy in ratings between high and low factor composites. For the male faces only 
the high and low self-rated extroversion composites elicited significantly accurate 
ratings although all but agreeableness were in the same direction as the self-ratings. 
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Again, although the effect sizes were small these results demonstrate that some 
degree of personality is visible in the face. 
However, this consensus about personality may be context-specific. The ‘Big Five’ 
personality model assumes cross-situational consistency; it is assumed that someone 
high in extroversion will be consistently high in extroversion throughout the majority 
of social contexts. Accuracy in evaluation of personality may well be spurious if any 
given individual’s self report of personality is not consistent across contexts.  
Indeed it has been argued that personality predicts very little of our behaviour 
compared with situation (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). However, agreement in 
personality judgements is not restricted to judgements of one’s own group on the 
basis of local social norms, there is also cross-cultural consensus on perceived 
personality. American and Chinese participants agree upon perceived personality in 
both American and Chinese faces (Albright et al., 1997) although there are 
suggestions that the greater individualism of American culture allows greater 
consensus where the collectivised culture of Chinese participants encourages them 
to represent faces much more on the basis of social role, i.e. predicting behaviour 
from identity context rather than personality (Malloy, Albright, Diaz-Loving, Dong, & 
Lee, 2004). 
In the competing predictions of situation dependent behaviour and personality 
dependent behaviour Buss (1989) argues that novel, formal and public situations, 
detailed instructions, little choice and brief duration favour an explanation of 
behaviour from the situation whereas the opposites of these favour a personality 
explanation (c.f. Chapter14, Eysenck, 1998, pp. 451-454 for discussion). Economic 
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games meet all the descriptive criteria for the former and from Buss’s argument 
should be best explained by any individual’s representation of the situation rather 
than conforming to any individual variation in innate predisposition or personality. A 
more complex picture is favoured by Atkinson et al (1993) who suggest that it would 
be more useful to interpret behaviour as being an interaction of personality and 
situation and put forward three forms of interaction: (a) reactive interaction: 
individuals interpret and experience situations in different ways, (b) evocative 
interaction: the behaviour of others is perhaps elicited by an individual’s choice of 
behaviour toward them or (c) proactive interaction: individuals choose the situations 
they wish to enter. 
Whatever the facts are, while personality may not predict all behaviour in any given 
situation, it does predict long-term predispositions and life behaviours and is 
significantly stable across contexts and time (McCrae & Costa, 1987). 
This distinction, between individual differences and context specific determinants of 
behaviour is of crucial importance when not just evaluating personality or identity 
but when actually attempting to predict future behaviour of an individual from his or 
her appearance. We are able to do this somewhat with the OCEAN measures of 
personality but are we able to perceived honesty or trustworthiness in economic 
transactions from appearances. 
Perceived Trustworthiness 
One of the evolutionary sources of cooperation was reciprocity. Therefore when 
deciding about trust it would make sense to use faces to judge the likelihood of 
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cooperative behaviour in any given individual. How accurately can we evaluate 
trustworthiness from faces? 
There is good reliability in ratings of honesty in faces. Zebrowitz et al (1996) report a 
Cronbach α=0.85 for ratings of facial photographs on a 7 point scale from very 
deceitful to very straightforward. The images presented were of people across a 
wide range of ages – from childhood through late 50s. Zebrowitz et al also report 
good reliability for ratings of attractiveness, babyfacedness, facial symmetry, eye size 
and expression positivity (an aggregate of two 7 point ratings from smile/no smile 
and happy/sad). All of these structural factors significantly predicted honesty ratings 
across most of the age range. This study also had access to clinical psychologists’ 
previous assessment by interview with regard to honesty. This actual honesty 
measure was an aggregate of two Q-sort items: “is guileful and deceitful” and 
“appears straightforward, forthright, candid in dealing with others.” There was no 
correlation found between clinician scores and rated facial honesty. 
In contrast, and supporting the hypothesis that individuals can accurately detect 
honest disposition in faces Bond et al (1994) had North American students indicate 
how willing they were to sign up to run experiments involving deceit. The students 
were given descriptions of eight experiments which they could choose to participate 
in. Two of the experiments involved no deception but the other eight required the 
student to deceive participants – including offering non-existent rewards, pretending 
to be ill and making up answers to questions. Photographs were taken after the 
students had chosen which experiments they would be willing to be involved with. 
Ratings for facial honesty in these photographs significantly correlated with their 
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willingness to take part in the deceptive experiments. However Masip and Garrido 
(2001) failed to replicate the experiment with Spanish participants. They suggest that 
perhaps while North American facial stereotypes are accurate Southern European 
facial stereotypes are not. The only obvious difference in methods between this 
replication and the original experiment is that where Bond et al (1994) took 
photographs at the time of the experiment Masip and Garrido (2001) had students 
supply their own passport-type colour photographs at a later date. It is possible that 
as the photographs in this later study were likely not standardised (especially for 
interaction with the photographer) this noise masked personality information about 
the participants rendering later ratings inaccurate. It is also possible that as the 
images in the Bond et al (1994) study were taken directly after participants had 
decided whether to be deceitful the photographs captured information about level 
of arousal or current mood. If present, this information would allow subsequent 
raters to recognise the decisions that participants had made in that moment rather 
than long-term predispositions. In fact transient expressions can support accurate 
evaluation of non-cooperation, although static images taken before the experiment 
were not significantly correctly judged in an experiment by Verplaetse et al (2007) 
when participants rated the facial images taken of individuals at the time they were 
deciding whether to cheat participants were significantly accurate in identifying the 
cheaters. Perceptions of trustworthiness may relate to similarity to facial expressions 
such as anger or fear (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009) but there is little evidence – apart 
from Bond et al (1994) – that biases based on stable facial traits are valid. 
Participants watching videos of self-reported altruists rate them as more “helpful” 
than self-reported non-altruists; these self-reported altruists smile more (Brown, 
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Palameta, & Moore, 2003). Additionally, after a 30 minute interaction participants 
can predict the future behaviour of their partner in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
(Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993) although we are, in general, very bad at spotting 
when others lie (DePaulo, 1994; Ekman, O’Sullivan, & Frank, 1999). 
Rather than being able to predict future behaviour in the form of predisposition to 
be dishonest Cosmides and Tooby (1992) have argued for a cheater detection 
module that recognises cheating and remembers who has honoured or violated 
social contracts in the past. Mealey et al (1996) lend this idea some support. 
Participants were shown faces accompanied by a blurb indicating that the person in 
the photograph has either a history of cheating, irrelevant information, or a history 
of trustworthiness. A week later the participants were called back and were asked to 
rate the same photographs and also indicate which they remembered as having seen 
the previous week. The participants showed a significantly better memory for the 
faces labelled as having a history of cheating. However, Barclay and Lalumiere (2006) 
suspected that there was asymmetry in the descriptors of cheaters and cooperators 
such that while cheaters were associated with a strongly emotive blurb the 
cooperators were not. They attempted to replicate the study but excluded both 
descriptions of cheaters and cooperators that were not cleanly categorised. They 
excluded descriptions of cheaters from Mealey et al (1996) that were also 
threatening or physically dangerous. They also excluded descriptions of cooperators 
that were altruistic or socially threatening rather than cleanly trustworthy. After 
controlling for this asymmetry they found no enhanced memory for any group. 
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Consistent with Mealey et al (1996), and without using descriptions, Yamagishi et al 
(2003) found that participants had a better memory for faces of individuals who 
were photographed at the moment they defected in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
They also found that participants were more likely to report they falsely recognised 
defectors than co-operators. This suggests a systematic difference in the facial 
information present in co-operators and defectors – although Yamagishi et al (2003) 
report that participants do no better than chance when asked to identify which faces 
are those of co-operators and which of defectors. 
Rather than having an ability to recognise untrustworthy individuals, we recognise 
when people are being untrustworthy and remember them.  
We may also have mechanism to adapt to local contexts and trust according to 
associations with familiarity. Buckingham et al (2006) find that participants adapt to 
faces they are presented. Participants were shown a slide show of 15 male faces and 
asked to memorise them. These faces were manipulated to be either more 
masculine or more feminine. Participants then made forced choices between two 
faces also manipulated for sexual dimorphism as to which looked more trustworthy. 
The exposure to masculine or feminine male faces increased subsequent attributions 
of trustworthiness to the type seen. 
This may relate to other reasons for ‘trusting’ previously discussed such as kin 
selective sources of cooperation. In testing whether kin selection may be implicated 
in decisions about facial trustworthiness DeBruine (2002) manipulated same-sex 
facial images to look either more self-similar or more similar to another unknown 
participant. Lending some support to the idea of kin selection in this instance, 
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trusting behaviour was indeed increased toward the self-similar faces and unaffected 
in the control condition. The level of reciprocity was not different when trusted by a 
self-similar counterpart versus an other-similar counterpart. 
It is possible that this result could be driven by self-similar facial images being 
considered more attractive. DeBruine (2005) follows this possibility up by testing 
self-similar opposite-sex facial images for trustworthiness, attractiveness for a long-
term relationship and attractiveness for a short-term relationship. The same-sex 
results of the previous work are replicated with opposite-sex faces; the self-similar 
opposite-sex faces in this study are more trusted than other-similar faces. The 
attractiveness judgements differ from this; opposite-sex self-similar faces are judged 
to be less attractive for a short term relationship and no different from stranger-
similar faces for attractiveness for a long-term relationship. This demonstrates that 
there is something like a kin selective preference for trusting self-similar faces that is 
not simply due to attractiveness. 
But why would we think that attractiveness would bias decisions about 
trustworthiness anyway? The evidence is that attractiveness predicts ratings of facial 
honesty. Attractiveness also predicts trust behaviour in games of strategy. 
Participants in a study by Mulford et al (1998) are both more willing to play games of 
strategy with and once playing, more likely to cooperate with more attractive 
participants in prisoner’s dilemma games apparently because participants expect 
attractive counterparts to be more cooperative. In Mulford et al (1998) this 
expectation is to some extent borne out, the attractive male individuals are more 
likely to be co-operative although attractive females are not. This suggests that 
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evaluations of trustworthiness – at least with males – are not merely ecologically 
valid, i.e. reliably made, but may also be functionally valid, i.e. have the intended 
consequences. Participants also offer attractive participants greater rewards (but 
demand more from them as well) in ultimatum games (Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). 
And in trust games (Wilson & Eckel, 2006). 
In other studies, however, attractive individuals have not been found to be more 
cooperative (Zebrowitz, et al., 1996) or have been found to be systematically less 
cooperative (Takahashi, Yamagishi, Tanida, Kiyonari, & Kanazawa, 2006; Zaatari & 
Trivers, 2007). 
We shall come back to attractiveness and the reasons it biases trust decisions in 
future chapters – but to tip my hand, think sexual selection. While males prioritise 
female attractiveness in mate choices, as discussed in the previous chapter females 
are likely to prioritise resources and investment behaviour. What is considered 
‘attractive’ in a mate will be different between the sexes, and how individuals 
compete with their own sex is likely to differ between the sexes as well.  
Signals of masculinity in males may indicate resource holding potential. Secondary 
sexual characteristics such as male facial masculinity are related to testosterone. 
Specifically, testosterone increase in response to winning competitive games is such 
that facially masculine men have a greater response (producing more circulating 
testosterone) than do other men as a result of winning a competitive task (Pound, 
Penton-Voak, & Surridge, 2009).  
One explanation why greater expression of testosterone as facial masculinity might 
be attractive is that it may cue immunocompetence, possibly because testosterone 
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stresses the immune system, so that only healthy males can afford large male traits 
(Folstad & Karter, 1992; Thornhill & Gangestad, 1999). Other explanations why 
masculinity should be attractive are that it may cue higher status or greater 
dominance (Buss, 1989) or that facial masculinity is related to measures of 
symmetry, specifically fluctuating asymmetry (FA) such that masculine males are 
more symmetric (Gangestad & Thornhill, 2003) and low FA is attractive (Perrett, 
1999). This FA in men is in turn associated with reduced cooperation in economic 
games (Zaatari & Trivers, 2007). Therefore amongst other things, masculinity and the 
hormone testosterone are likely to be relevant to cooperation, face perception and 
female mate choice because male dominance or heritable health should be 
attractive to females. 
Level of testosterone predicts economic game behaviour. Males with higher 
circulating testosterone are more likely to punish unfair economic game offers 
(reactive aggression) than are individuals with lower circulating testosterone 
(Burnham, 2003). High testosterone in men is also associated with increased 
aggression and behaviours aimed at achieving or maintaining high status (Archer, 
1991; Mazur & Booth, 1998; Olweus, Mattson, Schalling, & Low, 1980; Zitzmann & 
Nieschlag, 2001). 
Evidently the relationship between masculinity and male attractiveness is complex 
because cues to dominance and heritable health may also cue somewhat anti-social 
behaviour and while male attractiveness is clearly related to health and dominance it 
is also related to being prosocial (Farrelly, Lazarus, & Roberts, 2007; Hardy & Van 
Vugt, 2006; Jensen-Campbell, Graziano, & West, 1995; Roney, Hanson, Durante, & 
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Maestripieri, 2006). There should therefore be tradeoffs in female choice between 
cues to status, heritable health benefits and predispositions to less pro-social 
behaviour (see Rhodes, 2006 for discussion). 
Women do indeed appear to make tradeoffs in what they see as attractive. During 
the menstrual cycle phase of highest conception risk female participants show 
increased preference for deeper (more masculine) voices (Feinberg, 2006), for the 
odour of more dominant males (Havlicek, Roberts, & Flegr, 2005), for masculine 
faces (Johnston, Habel, Franklin, Fink, & Grammer, 2001; Penton-Voak et al., 1999), 
and reduced attention to perceived health (Jones, Perrett, et al., 2005). In a review 
of this literature Jones et al (2008) conclude that preferences for apparent health 
and self-resemblance are aimed at increasing the probability of successful pregnancy 
by avoiding contagion and improving social status whereas the evidence for 
masculinity preferences is equivocal between this and possible heritable benefits. 
Testosterone appears to be an explanatory factor for masculine traits and is also a 
component determining face preferences within individuals. Welling et al (2007) 
demonstrated that when making attractiveness judgements for male faces across 
the female cycle, females show an increase in preference for masculine male faces 
over feminine male faces when circulating testosterone is higher than at other points 
in the cycle (and other hormones are constant). A preference for more masculinity in 
males would be consonant with increased risk-taking and a reduced restriction in 
attitude to casual sex.  
Physiological effects of testosterone could to some extent explain more masculine 
behaviours in women. Schreiner-Engel et al. (1981) found positive correlations 
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between female salivary testosterone levels and genital response to erotic stimuli in 
the laboratory. Tuiten et al (1996) confirm testosterone as a mechanism for this, 
rather than a correlate, when they found that genital response was increased in 
amenorrheic women by testosterone administration. The North American 
Menopause Society (2005) has also found positive enhancement of sexual function 
in menopausal women with regard to desire, arousal, and orgasm with application of 
topical testosterone over that driven by placebo. 
Raised testosterone in women does not only increase male-typical attitudes in 
women with regard to sex. Dabbs et al (2002) show that participants of both sexes 
describe feelings of increased arousal and, noteworthy here, aggression. Participants 
scored more highly on implicit-attitude measures of arousal and aggression when 
their testosterone level is increased by application of testosterone gels to the skin 
when compared with a placebo. The placebo condition also showed significantly 
greater self-report and implicit measures of arousal and aggression than participants 
who ingested liquorice capsules (which lowers testosterone). The effects were 
stronger for women that for men. This supports the idea that just as high average 
basal testosterone males tend to be aggressive (Archer, 1991) high testosterone 
females are likely to be similarly aggressive and dominance seeking. 
These reported effects of testosterone upon female physiology and behaviour 
support the contention that testosterone has similar effects upon females and 
males. It is therefore likely, although not demonstrated, that naturally occurring 
variation in testosterone amongst women may also affect female facial appearance 
in a way that allows prediction of behaviour. Given that male testosterone measures 
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predict ultimatum game punishment for unfair behaviour (Burnham, 2003) it is likely 
that female circulating testosterone measures and facial correlates would also 
predict punishment. 
Why Trust Attractive People? 
We have evolved or learn capacities to read the predispositions of others in 
personality or current emotional state (or relatedness). We are likely to 
preferentially trust others whose facial features relate to reduced costs or increased 
benefits in some systematic manner. For example, if someone looks like kin, it may 
be likely that they are kin and therefore in the long term, acting to help those that 
look like kin has increased the replication of those genes that specify this behaviour. 
In the next chapter we discuss what is trusted about attractive faces. 
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Abstract: Choices about entering affiliative relationships are influenced by 
attractiveness. Our aim here was to determine facial cues relevant to attractiveness 
that influence trust decisions. In two experiments participants decided whether or 
not to trust faces of peers presented in neutral pose. We tested for associations 
between trust and facial attributions of health, attractiveness, masculinity and age. 
In experiment 1 perceived health explained the largest proportion of the variance in 
trust for both sexes but with facial masculinity and attractiveness also predicting 
trust placed in male faces. In experiment 2 we distinguished between perceived 
trustworthiness and trust decisions. We found that perceived trustworthiness was 
the strongest predictor of trust decisions and that only female sexual dimorphism 
independently contributed to these decisions (perceived health did not). When we 
considered which factors predicted perceived trustworthiness we found that 
perceived health and female age were the strongest predictors. We conclude that 
perceived health is a major factor in driving judgements of trustworthiness. This may 
be because association with healthy individuals increases the likelihood of durable 
future support and reciprocity. We also noted that whereas attractiveness 
(particularly in the form of perceived health) contributes to perceived 
trustworthiness in both sexes female attractiveness (in the form of femininity) 
creates a ‘beauty premium’ which elicits ‘trust’ decisions in excess of perceived 
trustworthiness. 
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In an elegant series of Trust Games Wilson and Eckel (2006) clearly demonstrated 
that the attractiveness of others influences our decisions whether to trust them. We 
place more trust in attractive than unattractive individuals; in Wilson and Eckel’s 
terminology we pay a “beauty premium” when we decide to trust. 
Why did participants place more trust in attractive counterparts? First, it is 
consistent with much other literature that shows that there is a ‘halo’ around 
attractive people. We have stereotypes about attractive people and assume them to 
be intelligent, competent, successful, and all-round better people (Langlois et al., 
2000); and we may even pay them more for doing the same jobs (Bull & Rumsey, 
1988). We may simply trust attractive people because we believe them to be more 
trustworthy and therefore assume that we will gain from trusting them. It was 
certainly true in Wilson and Eckel’s study that more attractive individuals were rated 
as more trustworthy and were more trusted in the games. 
Second, Wilson and Eckel note that there may be evolutionary reasons for behaving 
positively towards attractive people, as their attractiveness may cue 1) ‘good genes’, 
2) good parental investment or 3) high social status. We may want to buy into being 
their social affiliates for any of these reasons even if we do not actually feel trust for 
them more than others. Participants in Wilson and Eckel’s trust games may have 
trusted others in order to gain payoffs external to the game (X or Y in Table 1-2); 
participants might gain social status or affiliates by trusting. This does not require 
that individuals consciously evaluate their counterparts; the fact that these type of 
experiments are conducted between strangers with a very low probability of 
individuals ever interacting again but still produce these results suggests that 
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conscious evaluation of this kind is not a motivator. Instead we may have evolved a 
predisposition or learned a heuristic to behave well toward those in society we can 
benefit from as friends or as mates. 
The way the explanations from an attractiveness ‘halo’ or from evolved 
predisposition differ is exactly in where the benefit to individuals is in the payoff 
matrix (Table 1-2). If we trust attractive people because we believe them to be more 
trustworthy then the payoff is monetary whereas if we behave like this because we 
desire to affiliate ourselves with the individual to gain social status or ‘good genes’ 
then the payoff is external to the game i.e. in X or Y. 
As already stated, the results of Wilson and Eckel’s experiments showed that to 
some extent the payoff may have been monetary. Participants reported that they 
expected the attractive people to reciprocate their trust more than the less 
attractive people. In support of this interpretation, when trusted, counterparts in the 
‘unattractive’ group of Wilson and Eckel’s study were actually less trustworthy 
(returned less cash on average than they had been entrusted with) than the 
‘attractive’ groups of counterparts (who on average returned more than they were 
entrusted with).  
It is interesting to note that while attractive people are more often trusted in these 
games this did not necessarily mean that the attractive participants earned more. 
Participants also applied a “beauty penalty.” When trusted by an attractive 
compared with an unattractive counterpart participants returned more to the 
unattractive counterparts. This effect seems to have been driven by greater 
expectations of positive behaviour from the attractive trusters. Wilson and Eckel 
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asked how much they thought their counterpart would entrust to them. When the 
actual amount was higher than this expectation the attractiveness of their 
counterparts made no difference in the amount participants returned; when the 
amount entrusted was lower than expected participants returned significantly less to 
attractive than unattractive counterparts. 
It appears from this then that attractiveness elicits more trust (and attractive people 
are more trustworthy) but also that we expect more of attractive people and punish 
them more severely when they default on these expectations. 
The experiment reported here attempts to replicate and extend Wilson and Eckel’s 
experiment. Faces that are considered to be more attractive may be so for various 
reasons. Ratings of facial attractiveness are related to perceived health (Rhodes et 
al., 2007), sexual dimorphism (Perrett et al., 1998), symmetry and averageness (see 
Rhodes, 2006 for review). Symmetric faces are attractive because they have a 
healthy appearance (Jones et al., 2001). Immune system health in the form of MHC-
heterozygosity has been demonstrated to relate to attractiveness judgements 
(Roberts, Little, Gosling, Perrett, et al., 2005) and MHC dissimilarity also predicts 
attractiveness judgements (Roberts, Little, Gosling, Jones, et al., 2005). Youth is also 
related to female attractive alongside sexual dimorphism (Barber, 1995). 
These factors: perceived health, age, and sexual dimorphism should drive 
attractiveness judgements. We therefore conducted two experiments. In the first 
experiment participants played trust games while observing their counterpart’s facial 
image. These images were previously rated on attractiveness, health, youth and 
sexual dimorphism. The second experiment was conducted similarly but in order to 
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distinguish perceived trustworthiness from trust decisions the facial images were 
rated for perceived trustworthiness. 
Experiment 1 – Perceived Health and Trust 
Images 
We began with a collection of 132 white face images (66 male; mean age 20.5 years, 
SD = 2.25). Nineteen participants (white and aged 18–24) rated the images on 
various parameters. Images were masked (to exclude hair and clothing) and 
presented in random order. Each image was assessed on a likert-type scales of 1–7 
for (i) attractiveness; (ii) health, (iii) masculinity of male faces, (iv) femininity of 
female faces and finally (v) an estimation of age. 
Participants 
50 female and 58 male white students (age 18-24) at St Andrews University were 
recruited to take part in the trust games. 
Procedure 
Participants took part in a sequential trust game as defined in Chapter 1. Past 
experience of behaviour influences trust judgements (Paunonen, 2006) therefore in 
order to explore the bias of facial appearance participants must play the trust game 
with unfamiliar (zero-acquaintance) partners. 
Participants were given written instructions on how the game was played (see 
Appendix 1) and a flow chart of the game was present on screen throughout (See 
Appendix 2). Masked images (to exclude hair and clothing) were presented in 
random order and participants played as player 1 in all games. The only information 
available to them about player 2 was the presented image. 
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Participants had their photograph taken and were told that once they decided how 
to play in any given game the outcome of games would be dependent on the 
previous behaviour of their counterpart. Outcomes were randomly generated biased 
by the actual previous behaviour of participants (i.e. a counterpart that had 
previously reciprocated 90% of games would randomly reciprocate 90% of games). 
Participants took part for course credit and played the game with virtual money. 
Results 
As ratings of faces may tap into similar structures multi-collinearity might have been 
a problem for any or all of these analyses. We therefore checked at each level of 
analysis but none of the analyses reported a VIF value greater than 7.8 and most 
were considerably less than this. 
The facial attractiveness of counterparts correlates with how participants place their 
trust. All rated parameters of the 132 images correlated with the proportion of 
participants trust placed in them (Figure 3.1). Linear regression predicting trust of 
image with other-rated age, attractiveness, health, and sexual dimorphism explained 
~38% of the variance with (all VIF < 3.37). In a comparable stepwise regression 
analysis we found that health alone explained ~33% of the variance (r2 = 0.334, beta 
= 0.57; p < 0.0005 – see Figure 3.1) and there was no independent contribution from 
any other parameter.  
Images were split by sex and the data reanalysed. 
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132 images (66 male / 66 female) % Participants Trusted 
Health R = 0.58,  p < 0.0005 
Age R = -0.19,   p = 0.032 
Sexual Dimorphism R = 0.19,    p = 0.028 
Attractiveness R = 0.53,  p < 0.0005 
 
Figure 3-1 – All rated parameters correlated with trust decisions.  
Perceived health showed only independent contribution to regression model. 
Female images 
With the 66 female images there were significant correlations between trust and 
ratings of attractiveness (r = 0.56 p < 0.0005), perceived health (r = 0.62 p < 0.0005), 
femininity (r = 0.58 p < 0.0005) and perceived age (r = -0.27 p = 0.03). Linear 
regression predicting trust of image with other-rated age, attractiveness, health, and 
sexual dimorphism explained ~40% of the variance with (all VIF < 7.8). In a 
comparable stepwise regression model of trust decisions only perceived health was a 
significant predictor (r2 = 0.38; beta = 0.62; p < 0.0005). 
Male images 
With the 66 male images there were significant correlations between trust and 
ratings of attractiveness (r = 0.52 p < 0.0005) and perceived health (r = 0.56 p < 
0.0005). No effects were found for perceived age (p = 0.35) and masculinity (p = 
0.13). Linear regression predicting trust of image with other-rated age, 
r2 = 0.33 
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attractiveness, health, and sexual dimorphism explained ~43% of the variance with 
(all VIF < 3.1). In a comparable stepwise regression model of trust decisions 
perceived health, masculinity and attractiveness were all significant predictors (r2 = 
0.42; perceived health beta = 0.3, masculinity beta = -0.33, attractiveness beta = 
0.36; p < 0.0005). 
Experiment 2 – Perceived Trustworthiness and Trust 
In order to distinguish between perceived trustworthiness and trust decisions made 
for other reasons we ran a second study with images previously rated for perceived 
trustworthiness. We were also concerned that games played without real monetary 
payoffs may be played solely according to perceived trustworthiness rather than 
with any real-world pay-off in view. Participants therefore received real monetary 
payoffs. 
Images 
We selected 99 white face images (49 male; age 18-25). Nineteen participants rated 
the images on various parameters. Images were masked (to exclude hair and 
clothing) and presented in random order. Participants were white and aged 18–24. 
Each image was assessed on a likert-type scales of 1–7 for (i) attractiveness; (ii) 
health, (iii) masculinity of male faces, (iv) femininity of female faces, (v) an 
estimation of age, and (vi) an estimation of how trustworthy the individual looked. 
Participants 
49 female and 14 male Caucasian students (age 20-23) at St Andrews University 
were recruited to take part in trust games. 
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Procedure 
Participants took part in a ‘two-person’ sequential trust game as defined in Chapter 
1 with unfamiliar (zero-acquaintance) partners.  
Participants were given written instructions on how the game was played (see 
Appendix 1) and a flow chart of the game was present on screen throughout (See 
Appendix 2). Masked images (to exclude hair and clothing) were presented in 
random order and the participants were randomly assigned as player 1 or 2 for each 
game (seeing each identity of image in only one game). The only information 
available to them about their counterpart for each game was the presented image. 
Participants had their photograph taken and were told that once they decided how 
to play in any given game the outcome of games would be dependent on the 
previous behaviour of their counterpart. Outcomes were randomly generated biased 
by the actual previous behaviour of participants (i.e. a counterpart that had 
previously reciprocated 90% of games would randomly reciprocate 90% of games). 
Participants were informed that the game outcomes would be paid in cash and 
converted at a lab exchange rate that would mean that final payment would be 
equivalent to the outcome of one game. 
Results 
Trust (player 1) and reciprocation (player 2) decisions correlated with all image 
ratings (see Table 3-1). Linear regression predicting trust of image with all image 
ratings explained ~74% of the variance with (all VIF < 5.9). In a comparable stepwise 
regression only perceived trustworthiness and sexual dimorphism predicted trust 
decisions (r2 = 0.74; trustworthiness beta = 0.26, sexual dimorphism beta = 0.03; p < 
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0.0005; VIF = 1.22). In a t-test participants did not show significantly different 
amount of trust in this experiment compared with experiment 1 (p = .72). 
Decisions to reciprocate trust also correlated with all image ratings (see Table 3-1). 
Linear regression predicting trust of image with all image ratings explained ~33% of 
the variance with (all VIF < 5.97). In a comparable stepwise regression perceived 
trustworthiness was also the best predictor for this but perceived health and age 
also explained some of the variance (r2 = 0.33; trustworthiness beta = 0.05, 
perceived health beta = 0.04, perceived age beta = -0.013; p < 0.0005; VIF < 1.82). 
A stepwise regression predicting perceived trustworthiness from perceived health, 
age, sexual dimorphism and attractiveness found that only perceived health and age 
were independent predictors (r2 = 0.45; perceived health beta = 0.445, perceived age 
beta = -0.079; p < 0.0005; VIF = 1.004). 
Table 3-1 – Perceived ratings correlate with trust and reciprocation decisions. 
99 images (49 male / 50 female) % Participants Trusted % Participants Reciprocated 
Perceived Trustworthiness r = 0.85,  p < 0.0005 r = 0.51,  p < 0.0005 
Perceived Health r = 0.59,  p < 0.0005 r = 0.48,  p < 0.0005 
Perceived Age r = -0.22,    p = 0.028 r = -0.27,    p = 0.008 
Perceived Sexual Dimorphism r = 0.47,  p < 0.0005 r = 0.34,  p = 0.001 
Perceived Attractiveness r = 0.62,  p < 0.0005 r = 0.46,  p < 0.0005 
 
Data was split by sex of image and data reanalysed. 
Female images 
Stepwise regression showed perceived trustworthiness and femininity to be 
independent predictors of trust decisions (r2 = 0.80; trustworthiness beta = 0.28, 
femininity beta = 0.05; p < 0.0005; VIF = 1.79). 
Decisions to reciprocate trust with female images was predicted by both perceived 
trustworthiness and health (r2 = 0.72; trustworthiness beta = 0.11, perceived health 
beta = 0.07; p < 0.0005; VIF = 2.09). Excluding perceived trustworthiness from the 
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analysis allowed a significant model (r2 = 0.61; perceived health beta = 0.12; p < 
0.0005). 
A stepwise regression predicting perceived trustworthiness from perceived health, 
age, sexual dimorphism and attractiveness found that only perceived health and age 
were independent predictors (r2 = 0.76; perceived health beta = 0.434, perceived age 
beta = -0.093; p < 0.0005; VIF = 1.12). 
Male images 
Stepwise regression showed perceived trustworthiness is a significant predictor of 
trust decisions (r2 = 0.70; trustworthiness beta = 0.25; p < 0.0005). No other image 
rating independently contributed to the model. 
Decisions to reciprocate trust with male images were not predicted by any other 
rated facial parameter (all p > 0.6).  
A stepwise regression predicting perceived trustworthiness from perceived health, 
age, sexual dimorphism and attractiveness found that only perceived health was an 
independent predictor (r2 = 0.62; perceived health beta = 0.448; p < 0.0005). 
Discussion 
In line with the results from Wilson and Eckel (2006) we find a strong relationship 
between attractiveness and trust. We did, however, find that perceived health was a 
stronger predictor of perceived trustworthiness with perhaps an independent 
contribution from female youth and male masculinity and attractiveness. 
There was no significant different in the proportion of trust decisions between the 
unpaid condition in experiment 1 and the paid condition in experiment 2. In 
experiment 1 where participants were unpaid we found that perceived health (and 
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male masculinity and attractiveness) predicted decisions to trust counterparts. In 
experiment 2 we found that perceived health (and female youth) predicted rated 
trustworthiness. 
In experiment 2 we found that perceived trustworthiness was the most significant 
predictive variable in regression models of actual trust game decisions played with 
real monetary payoffs. The only other perceived facial attributes that independently 
predicted trust decisions was female femininity. This is noteworthy as it is a first step 
toward teasing apart which facial attributes may drive perceived trustworthiness and 
which may drive what Wilson and Eckel called a ‘beauty premium.’  
Participants in our games trusted healthy people. This may be because healthier 
individuals are more trustworthy. Health is predictive of altruism in the second 
player role of trust games (Fehr, Fischbacher, Schupp, Rosenbladt, & Wagner, 
2003b). Indeed there is more general evidence that healthy individuals are those 
that are volunteers, giving to others appears to enhance one’s own health (Brown, 
Consedine, & Magai, 2005) and therefore perceived health may be a good proxy for 
trustworthiness. Or perhaps health is related to a disposition to positive affect and 
therefore salient (particularly in men) as an attractive and prosocial feature (Jensen-
Campbell, et al., 1995; Roney, et al., 2006) particularly as prosociality leads to high 
status (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006) and altruism is attractive in and of itself (Farrelly, et 
al., 2007). 
The evidence here suggests that facial attributes affect trust decisions in two ways. 
Trust is placed in healthy individuals (as well as in less masculine men and youthful 
women) because participants perceive them to be trustworthy whereas facial 
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femininity in women elicits ‘trust’ in excess of perceived trustworthiness. Whereas 
trusting those we perceive as trustworthy could reasonable be seen as aimed at 
gaining the extra payoff in the Trust Game, trusting a counterpart in excess of how 
trustworthy they appear to be would seem to be aimed at gaining payoffs external 
to the Trust Game (X or Y payoffs in Table 1-2). 
Perceived Health is Trusted, Femininity is ‘Trusted’ 
Our data is in line with Wilson and Eckel’s findings that attractiveness is both used as 
a cue to trustworthiness and as something more, in their words a ‘beauty premium.’ 
From our data, perceived health appears to be the component of attractiveness that 
is the most significant driver of perceived trustworthiness and female facial 
femininity emerges as the only component of attractiveness measured that elicits 
the excess ‘trust’ of a ‘beauty premium.’ 
Wilson and Eckel did not find any effects from participant sex other than that 
females returned more when trusted by male participants. While Wilson and Eckel 
(and also Andreoni & Petrie, 2008) found effects of attractiveness and no effects of 
sex on game play they did not test for interactions between sex of participants and 
differential effects of opposite sex attractiveness. This may not matter if 
attractiveness cues social status but if attractiveness cues ‘good genes’ or parental 
investment then we should expect that female attractiveness and male 
attractiveness have differing effects upon male and female observers. With this in 
mind, femininity does not have a clear relationship with health but may rather be 
related to fertility (Johnston, 2000; Johnston & Franklin, 1993; Rhodes, 2006; 
Symons, 1979). Indeed facial femininity has been shown to positively associated with 
oestrogen, an index of reproductive health (Law Smith et al., 2006). We would 
P a g e  | 55 
therefore expect that female facial femininity should be attractive to males when 
making mate choices as over evolutionary time males’ attraction to fertile and 
fecund females would likely have been selected for. 
We did not split these studies by the sex of participants as the experiment had not 
been designed with this in mind but we should expect that males – but not females – 
should be affected by female facial femininity as a mate choice relevant attribute 
and therefore that males – but not females – should be placing excess ‘trust’ in 
attractive female counterparts.  
This anaysis, that facial features relevant to mate choice are implicated in Trust 
Game decisions, suggests that behaviour in economic games is susceptible to bias 
from psychological mechanisms that have little to do with Homo economicus 
preferences and everything to do with instinctive response to the imperative to 
reproduce. 
In the next few chapters we will explore possible sexually selective effects 
influencing participant play in the trust game. 
  
P a g e  | 56 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 1 Summary: 
 
Trustworthiness has multiple evolutionary sources, one source is the cooperation 
required over reproduction which leads to partner choice and costly signalling. Faces 
are a rich information source of personality and social identity and as such may allow 
reliable and valid trust judgements. Facial attractiveness is seen as trustworthy, as a 
‘halo’ and this aspect of facial attractiveness is somewhat based in perceived health. 
Female attractiveness related to femininity elicits excess ‘trust’ that is unrelated to 
perceived trustworthiness. This may make sense in light of sexual selection for 
female fertility.
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Section 2 
Sexual Selection: Male Display and Female Choice 
Cooperation decisions are biased by attractiveness, part of this is a ‘halo’ effect such 
that we assume more attractive people to be better people.  
Chapter 4: Data is presented such that men pay attention to female attractiveness 
over and above the ‘halo’ effect and display increased cooperation toward more 
attractive women.  
Chapter 5: Women seem to be equally affected by a male and female attractiveness 
‘halo’ when making trust decisions, however while female participants were also 
more likely to reciprocate with attractive females, male attractiveness related 
positively to exploitation of trust. It appears that women recognise male trust as 
being an offer of ongoing interaction rather than actual trust and the female 
response is, at least in part, a signal of acceptance or rejection (maintaining 
reciprocity with less attractive males). 
Chapter 6: In an explicitly dating context female participants show a similar pattern 
of decisions to those they make in trust games. This lends support to the 
interpretation that female participants recognise male display in the form of ‘trust’ 
and choose to reciprocate with an acceptance signal of their own. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Male Display in Trust Games 
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Abstract: Prior research has shown that men in better physical quality (more 
attractive or more symmetrical) show less cooperation in economic games. Two 
explanations have been hypothesised for this, either lower quality men (a) have 
greater need to display cooperation in order to attract mates or (b) have greater 
need of strategic alliance to secure resources. We explored how male self-rated 
physical dominance interacted with counterpart sex and counterpart attractiveness 
in Trust Games. Male participants played Trust Games with strangers (with 
standardised neutrally posed facial images of counterparts). This provided two 
measures of cooperative behaviour; trust and reciprocation. We find that males 
cooperate in the Trust Game as a sexual display; cooperation is modulated by female 
more than male attractiveness. When comparing men reporting high physical 
dominance with those reporting low physical dominance we found support of 
hypothesis (a) higher physical dominance predicted less sexual display when making 
trust decisions and in support of hypothesis (b) more physically dominant men 
showed less reciprocation toward male counterparts. In conclusion, our results show 
that male Trust Game decisions are modulated both by sexual display and strategic 
alliance considerations and that these both interact with male quality. 
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A factor that modulates male behaviour in economic games is physical quality. Men 
with low fluctuating asymmetry make lower Ultimatum Game offers (Zaatari & 
Trivers, 2007) while men rated as more physically attractive are less cooperative in 
Prisoner's Dilemma, Allocator Choice, Faith, as well as in Trust Games (Takahashi, et 
al., 2006). We explored reasons for this relationship between physical quality and 
reduced cooperation using the Trust Game. 
Two explanations for the variation in male behaviour are put forward by Zaatari and 
Trivers (2007). The first is that better quality males need display less pro-social 
behaviour in order to gain mates; Cooperation is aimed at sexual display. That males 
display prosocial behaviour in order to obtain sexual access fits well with theories of 
sexual selection and parental investment (Andersson, 1991; Gangestad & Simpson, 
2000; Trivers, 1971). Males under this interpretation are displaying their resources 
and their willingness to invest in order to elicit female attention and thereafter 
possible reproductive access. Females are likely to trade-off between physical quality 
(as a proxy for good genes) and beneficial behavioural traits (such as cooperation) 
when assessing mates. Males with better physical quality need therefore to display 
less cooperation in attracting mates and are therefore less cooperative.  
The second explanation for reduced cooperation in males with better physical 
quality is that males are likely to vary in their need for cooperation in obtaining 
resources; stronger, more able males gain less from a strategic alliance than do 
weaker less able males. Men with better physical quality may have “superior ability 
in obtaining resources, especially in situations involving aggression” (Zaatari & 
Trivers, 2007). As better quality men may be able to use aggression and coercion 
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more easily they would have less need of strategic alliances and would therefore be 
less cooperative. Our experimentation was aimed at exploring these two 
explanations of male behaviour.  
Male behaviour in financial contexts has been demonstrated to be biased by sexual 
factors. When offered a choice between a sum of money now or a larger sum of 
money next week, men who are shown pictures of attractive women are more likely 
to discount the future and take the money now (Wilson & Daly, 2004). Similarly, 
when offered the chance to make donations to charity, men who are observed by an 
attractive woman are significantly more likely to make more generous donations 
(Iredale, et al., 2008). Male behaviour is also influenced by sexual factors in 
economic games. In ultimatum games, while women make equal offers to male or 
female counterparts, men offer more to female than to male counterparts (Saad & 
Gill, 2001). Male behaviour is also influenced by possible proceptive sexual cues in 
that they are more influenced by smiles than female participants while additionally 
trusting opposite sex counterparts with more money than same-sex counterparts 
(Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001). Over and above all of this, men are 
influenced by more specifically reproductive factors while making economic 
decisions in that men have also been shown to give greater amounts of money to 
ovulating females in lap-dancing establishments (Miller, et al., 2007).  
Of course, financial behaviour is also modulated by counterpart attractiveness 
irrelevant of sex; more attractive people get more cooperation (Solnick & 
Schweitzer, 1999; Wilson & Eckel, 2006). This effect appears to be both because 
participants expected more attractive counterparts to be more cooperative, i.e. a 
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‘halo’ (See Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991; Langlois, et al., 2000), but 
also, when expectations of cooperation are statistically controlled, participants 
prefer to interact positively with better looking people even when they were 
expected not to cooperate (Mulford, et al., 1998). This was true of both male and 
female participants. While it may be possible to interpret this as an aesthetic 
preference for interaction with beautiful people rather than anything explicitly 
sexual, if male participants are sexually displaying their prosocial credentials we 
should expect male altruism to be modulated by an ‘aesthetic preference’ for female 
attractiveness more than for male attractiveness. 
From the forgoing we therefore expected behaviour in our games to replicate effects 
from: male quality, sex of counterpart and attractiveness of counterpart. To 
summarise: (a) more dominant men would be less cooperative; (b) participants 
would cooperate more with female counterparts and (c) participants would 
cooperate more with attractive counterparts. However, we also expected 
interactions between these effects. The nature of these interactions should allow us 
to decide between the hypothesised explanations posited by Zaatari and Trivers for 
reduced cooperation in better quality males.  
While it seemed likely to us that men use cooperation to both display their sexual 
appeal and in order to gain alliances we considered which of these two motivations 
to cooperate explain the modulating effect of physical quality on male behaviour. 
The parameter that is crucial in differentiating between these is counterpart 
attractiveness.  
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If males are showing cooperation as a sexual display there are two main predictions 
from counterpart attractiveness. The first prediction is due to the structure of the 
Trust Game. A ‘halo’ effect from attractiveness only has scope where participants 
make predictions about counterpart behaviour. As the ‘reciprocation’ decision is the 
ending move in the Trust Game there is little scope for a ‘halo’ in this role. We 
therefore expected a ‘halo’ in ‘trust’ decisions but not in ‘reciprocation’ decisions. 
We therefore predicted that (1) male counterpart attractiveness would affect 
participant behaviour only in the ‘trust’ role whereas female counterpart 
attractiveness would affect participant behaviour in both Trust Game roles. The 
second prediction, previously discussed, was that (2) female counterpart 
attractiveness (as a sexual “aesthetic preference”) would be more predictive of male 
cooperation than male counterpart attractiveness in both trust and reciprocation. 
If males are showing cooperation for strategic alliance male counterparts should be 
more important for this than female counterparts and therefore participants would 
trust and reciprocate more with male than with female counterparts. Counterpart 
attractiveness may be seen as a ‘halo’ in ‘trust’ decisions but is likely to have little 
effect in ‘reciprocation’ decisions. 
How these effects interact with male quality is complicated. Our predictions here are 
that individuals will focus their effort where it best serves their interests. In playing 
the Trust Game effort might be expended evaluating trustworthiness but might 
equally be expended evaluating mate value or strategic alliance value. Therefore if, 
as we predict, male behaviour is modulated by the sex and (female) sexual 
attractiveness of their counterparts we should also expect a further interaction with 
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participant quality. If the first explanation from Zaatari and Trivers (2007) is correct, 
cooperation is a sexual display, we should find lower quality males to be more 
motivated to make decisions about sexual display i.e. female attractiveness should 
modulate decisions of lower quality males more than higher quality males. On the 
other hand, if as also suggested by Zaatari and Trivers (2007) the relevant 
explanation of male behaviour is strategic alliance we should find that lower quality 
males make more effort in strategic alliance decisions than higher quality males i.e. 
lower quality males will make more decisions to cooperate with males. 
Experiment: Trust Game (Male Display) 
Participants 
32 male participants were recruited from students at the University of St Andrews. 
Given the nature of our hypotheses, data from two participants reporting non-
heterosexual sexual preferences were excluded from the analysis. The data from 30 
male participants (mean age = 21.1, s.d. = 1.21) who took part in a ‘two-person’ 
binary choice sequential Trust Game is reported below. 
Images 
50 males and 50 females (white; aged 18-25) were photographed in neutral pose. 
Forty one participants (17 male/24 female; mean age = 21, s.d. = 3.29) rated the 
facial images for attractiveness on a Likert-type scale of 1–7. Images were masked 
(to exclude hair and clothing) and presented in random order. The attractiveness of 
each facial image was calculated as the mean rating for that face across all 
participants. The reliability of attractiveness ratings was very high (Cronbach’s α > 
0.9).  
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Experiment Procedure 
We used a binary choice version of the Trust Game as outlined in Chapter 1. 
Participants were photographed and were informed that the outcomes of their 
games would be dependent upon the previous behaviour of the individuals in the 
photographs and that their final payment for the games would be equivalent to the 
outcome of one of the games they played. 
Participants were given written instructions on how the game was played (see 
Appendix 1) and a flow chart of the game was present on screen throughout (See 
Appendix 2). Before the game started participants ran through a number of 
examples to familiarise them with the possible decisions and outcomes in the game. 
The only information available about their counterpart for each game was a facial 
image masked to exclude hair and clothing.  
The previously rated facial images 50 male and 50 female were used for game play. 
Images were split by sex in to two blocks of games. Within each block participants 
played with half of the images as player one and half as player two with additional 
25 blank filler images as counterparts who chose not to trust the participant. The 
blocks were presented in randomised order and games within each block were also 
presented in randomised order. 
The outcome of each game was decided by participants where they were player 2 
and were randomised biased to previous play for games where participants trusted 
as player 1 (e.g. if counterpart previous reciprocated 90% there would be a 90% 
chance of reciprocation). 
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Self-rating 
Participants stated how much they agreed with the following statement on a Likert-
type scale of 1 to 7: “If you were engaged in a physical fight with a same-sex peer, 
you would probably win.” (from Puts, Gaulin, & Verdolini, 2006). 
Analysis 
Data was analysed only from individuals reporting heterosexual preference. Facial 
images were previously rated for attractiveness as described above. Facial images 
were ranked by rated attractiveness and split into groups of the 12 most and 12 least 
attractive group, discarding the median images. Participants played trust or 
reciprocation game roles with faces that were split for analysis into male or female, 
and high or low attractiveness.  
Eight scores were calculated for each participant; Four scores for ‘trust’ decisions 
calculated as the proportion of trust decisions made with the 12 most attractive and 
with the 12 least attractive male images and the same proportions with the 12 most 
and least attractive female images. Four scores were also calculated for these 12 
image groups for ‘reciprocation’ decisions as well. 
Self-rated dominance and attractiveness were split at the means, both of which were 
between 4 and 5, scores of 1-4 were therefore treated as low and 5-7 were as high. 
Results 
Participants chose to trust 46% of their counterparts and reciprocate with 68% of 
their counterparts. They trusted female counterparts more often than male (Paired 
t-test: t30 = 2.7, p = 0.012; see Fig. 4-1) and reciprocated more often with male 
counterparts than female (Paired t-test: t30 = 2.5, p = 0.02; see Fig. 4-1). 
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Figure 4-1 – Male players ‘trust’ females and ‘reciprocate’ with males. Male players trusted female 
counterparts more often and reciprocated with male counterparts more often. 
 
Hypotheses were tested by mixed 3 way ANOVA with the within participant factors: 
sex of image (2 levels), image attractiveness (2 levels) and the between participant 
factor self-rated dominance (2 levels).  
Player one: Trust decisions 
The ANOVA revealed a main effect from the attractiveness of the images on trust 
judgments, (ANOVA: F1,24 = 30.2, p < .0005, Fig. 4-2). More attractive individuals were 
more trusted. Additionally, there was a main effect from the sex of the images, 
(ANOVA: F1,24 = 4.4, p = .046, Fig. 4-2). The male players invested more trust in 
female images. There was also a significant interaction between attractiveness of the 
image and the sex of the image (ANOVA: F1,24 = 5.4, p = .03, Fig. 4-2) Male players 
trust decisions were more affected by female attractiveness than by male 
attractiveness. There was no significant difference in t-test between male (mean = 
2.04) and female (mean = 2.09) images in rated attractiveness (p = .34). 
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Figure 4-2 – Sex, facial attractiveness and proportion of trust judgements. Players trusted attractive 
more often than unattractive images (ANOVA: F1,24 = 30.2, p < .0005) and female more often than 
male images (ANOVA: F1,24 = 4.4, p = .046). Players’ trust was also more affected by female 
attractiveness than by male attractiveness (ANOVA: F1,24 = 5.4, p = .03). 
 
Self-rated dominance had no effect on the overall proportion of faces trusted 
(ANOVA: F1,24 = 1.1, p = 0.3) but there was an interaction between sex of image, 
attractiveness and self-rated dominance (ANOVA: F1,24 = 5.1, p = .034, Fig. 4-3). The 
less dominant males showed greater sensitivity to female attractiveness than did the 
more dominant males but for male faces the effects of attractiveness were 
equivalent. 
We further explored this result by running 2-way ANOVAs separately for the 2 
dominance groups. Less dominant participants showed a main effect of 
attractiveness (ANOVA: F1,9 = 6.5, p = 0.03), no effect of sex of face (ANOVA: F1,9 = 
1.8, p = 0.2) and a sex of face by attractiveness interaction (ANOVA: F1,9 = 10.6, p = 
0.01, Fig. 4-3). The more dominant men also showed a main effect from 
attractiveness (ANOVA: F1,15 = 36.0, p < 0.0005) but no effect from sex of face 
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(ANOVA: F1,15 = 2.9, p = 0.11) and no interaction between sex of face and 
attractiveness (ANOVA: F1,15 = 0.04, p = 0.95, Fig. 4-3). 
 
Figure 4-3 – The effect of self-reported dominance on proportion of faces trusted. Less dominant 
males were more affected by female than male attractiveness (F1,9 = 10.6, p = 0.01) whereas more 
dominant males were not more affected by female attractiveness (F1,15 = 0.04, p = 0.95). 
Player two: Reciprocation 
Participants showed a main effect with more attractive images eliciting more 
reciprocation from male game play (ANOVA: F1,24 = 11.0, p < .005, Fig. 4-4). A main 
effect from the sex of image was also seen (ANOVA: F1,24= 10.5 p = .004, Fig. 4-4). 
Male participants reciprocated more with male image counterparts than with 
female. Image sex and attractiveness interacted, however, such that while more 
attractive images elicited more reciprocation overall this did not appear to be true of 
the male images (ANOVA: F1,24 = 13.2 p < .005, Fig. 4-4). Tested separately there was 
no effect of male image attractiveness on reciprocation decisions (Paired t-test: t26 = 
0.45, p = 0.65). 
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Figure 4-4 - Effects of sex and facial attractiveness on proportion of reciprocation judgements. 
Players reciprocated more often with more attractive counterparts (ANOVA: F1,24 = 11.0, p < .005) but 
an interaction with sex of image showed this to be driven by female attractiveness (ANOVA: F1,24 = 
13.2 p < .005). Additionally, male participants showed a preference to reciprocate with male rather 
than female counterparts (ANOVA: F1,24 = 10.5 p = .004). 
 
Self-rated dominance had no effect on the overall proportion of reciprocation 
(ANOVA: F1,24 = 0.76, p = 0.39) but interacted with sex of image such that less 
dominant males showed a greater preference for reciprocation with male images 
(ANOVA: F1,24 = 4.7 p = .04, Fig. 4-5). There was no interaction between sex of image, 
attractiveness and self-rated dominance (ANOVA: F1,24 = 1.8, p = 0.2). The low 
dominant males did not show greater sensitivity to female attractiveness than the 
high dominant males when making reciprocation decisions. 
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Figure 4-5 – The effect of self-reported dominance on proportion of faces shown reciprocation. Less 
dominant males showed a greater preference for reciprocation with male images (ANOVA: F1,24 = 4.7 
p = .04). 
Discussion: Men ‘Display’ Trust 
Participants showed a clear tendency in the Trust Game to cooperate as a sexual 
display in two ways. First, female attractiveness always elicited more cooperation 
than male attractiveness and second, where attractiveness effects could not be 
explained as a ‘halo’, female attractiveness (but not male) modulated cooperation.  
While physical dominance did not predict overall trust and reciprocation it did 
interact with the other variables. Trust decisions were more influenced by female 
attractiveness among the less dominant males than the more dominant males. The 
less dominant males were also more likely than more dominant males to reciprocate 
with counterpart males. 
The differing moderating effects of physical dominance between Trust Game roles 
may be explained by the different payoff structure between those roles. The two 
roles have different social valences. While the trust decision is somewhat ethically 
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neutral and based in expectancies of behaviour a negative reciprocation decision is 
exploitative and may run contrary to social norms (Hardin, 2002). Also, a decision to 
trust is a decision to initiate an interaction whereas the reciprocation decision is 
taken in response to such an initiation.  
Trust in the form of sexual display is relatively low cost and possibly high payoff, if 
the male can attract the attractive female counterpart, and females may value 
cooperative behaviour over good genes. Trust as initiation of social alliance although 
similarly low cost is less likely as high payoff. Although, less dominant males are less 
discriminating over male counterpart attractiveness, perhaps soliciting alliance with 
males they suspect are untrustworthy. 
Reciprocation as sexual display plays out here as exploitation of less attractive 
female counterparts and is behaviour seen equally in more and less dominant males. 
Reciprocation as alliance seeking behaviour is clearly seen as the less dominant 
males cooperate with males that have initiated an interaction. 
In our data there are significant main effects on participant trust and reciprocation 
from both counterpart sex and attractiveness. In partial support of Takahashi and 
colleagues it is clear that our male participants trust female counterparts in order to 
impress these females with their social altruism, at least in part. Equally clearly, in 
support of Zaatari and Trivers, is that better quality males are less reciprocating 
because they have less need for strategic alliance: in the case of physically dominant 
males, they have less need of alliance with other males, and for more attractive 
males, they have less need of alliance with anyone. 
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The original trust games carried out by (Berg, et al., 1995) showed no difference 
between roles but, opposite to our data, it is typical for players to show more trust 
than reciprocation (cf. Henrich, et al., 2004). It is likely that our participants 
responded to the presence of the on-screen faces as the mere presence of abstract 
‘eyespots’ on screen can increase cooperation in anonymous economic games (Haley 
& Fessler, 2005) similarly, the presence of identity information dramatically 
increases both trust and, particularly, reciprocation behaviour to similar levels shown 
by our participants (Huck, et al., 2007). 
Effects of counterpart sex on male behaviour in economic games has been 
demonstrated previously (Saad & Gill, 2001) as have attractiveness effects (Mulford, 
et al., 1998; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999; Wilson & Eckel, 2006). A result here that to 
our knowledge is previously unreported is that these effects also interact such that 
female attractiveness has a stronger effect than male attractiveness upon male 
decisions.  
The modulating effect of self-reported physical dominance was such that more 
dominant males treated male and female attractiveness equivalently for trust 
decisions whereas less dominant males preferentially trusted attractive female 
counterparts. A similar modulating effect on trust was observed from self-rated 
attractiveness. Less attractive participants (compared with more attractive 
participants) were more likely to trust attractive women. 
These results are equivocal in deciding between the two explanations for male 
differences. Male trust decisions provide evidence for sexual display because more 
dominant (and probably more attractive) males show less concern to trust the 
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attractive females. Male reciprocation decisions, however, suggest strategic alliance 
motivations because less dominant males reciprocate more often with male 
counterparts and more attractive males reciprocate less with all counterparts. At the 
same time there is a modulation of the sex of face by attractiveness interaction from 
neither physical dominance nor male attractiveness.  
It should be noted that the measure of cooperation used by Zaatari and Trivers 
(Zaatari & Trivers, 2007) were ultimatum game offers and the measures that 
Takahashi and colleagues (Takahashi, et al., 2006) used were the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
and continuous versions of the Allocator Choice, Faith, and Trust Games. These 
measures, especially the ultimatum game offers, are all more similar in kind to the 
reciprocation stage of our binary Trust Game and as such may be best explained as 
male variance in strategic alliance decisions rather than sexual display but further 
experimentation would be required to confirm this. 
It is also interesting to note while highly physically dominant men may have better 
access to resources where it is dependant on interactions with men, i.e. possibly 
aggressive or competitive interaction, this may not be as true of male interactions 
with women. Highly attractive men, on the other hand, may have advantages in all 
social interactions.  
In summary, our results support the idea that male participants in Trust Games 
display cooperation to females as a sexual display. There is evidence that male 
quality may modulate sexual display in trust decisions but that male quality 
modulates strategic alliance considerations in reciprocation decisions. Higher quality 
men reciprocate less as they have less need of cooperation. 
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In the next chapter we turn to female Trust Game behaviour that suggests that this 
male display is recognised as a display. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Female choice in Trust Games 
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Abstract: Male financial behaviour has been shown to be modulated by sexual 
factors, even in exclusively financial contexts. While female financial behaviour is 
influenced by sexual factors in explicit courtship contexts such influences have not 
been shown in non-sexual contexts. We explored the influence of attractiveness on 
the financial behaviour of females in the context of the trust game, focusing on male 
facial attractiveness. Facial attractiveness of both sexes predicts female trust 
behaviour. Facial attractiveness also predicts reciprocation behaviour, however 
while female facial attractiveness predicts positive reciprocation, female participants 
exploit the trust of attractive males more often than unattractive males. Participants 
are also less likely to reciprocate with males than females. These results are 
consistent with the notions that females: (a) recognise that male financial ‘trust’ is in 
part sexually motivated and, (b) exploitation of that ‘trust’ is indicative of social or 
sexual interest in males. 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 78 
From the last chapter we have seen that men are influenced by sexual factors when 
making decisions that are otherwise non-sexual such as financial decisions. Also as 
discussed previously these findings about male financial behaviour all make sense in 
light of sexual selection and conflict over parental investment (Trivers, 1972). 
Men have consistent biases to display their generosity and wealth by potential or 
actual investment in women they consider attractive. Evidence that female 
behaviour in financial contexts is influenced by such sexual display is sparser. 
As mentioned, the theory would predict that women should discriminate between 
men on the basis of resources and displayed generosity. There is some evidence for 
this in female self-reports. In surveys of criteria for long-term sexual partners both 
sexes emphasise items such as mutual attraction, being dependable, emotional 
stability and kindness, however there are sex differences. Specifically, while men 
emphasise the importance of physical attractiveness more, women emphasise social 
status and resource (Buss, 1989). Li et al (2002) found that these sex differences are 
best understood when contrasting necessary and luxury factors. A minimum of 
physical attractiveness is necessary in a partner for men but for women a man must 
have a minimum level of social resource or status. Other items, such as kindness, are 
very desirable for both sexes but nevertheless are luxuries.  
That men display wealth and that women are willing recipients of gifts is not 
surprising. It is clear that gift-giving is a feature of human courtship (Greer & Buss, 
1994; Griskevicius et al., 2007; Hawkes, 1993; Hawkes & Bliege Bird, 2002; Huang, 
2000; Iredale, et al., 2008; Jonason, Cetrulo, Madrid, & Morrison, 2009; Miller, 2007; 
Miller, et al., 2007; Saad, 2006; Sanderson, Keiter, Miles, & Yopyk, 2007). The 
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question we wished to explore here was whether this aspect of female behaviour 
would generalise to non-sexual contexts. If men are biased to both display wealth 
and invest in women to such an extent that it influences their behaviour in the Trust 
Game it is possible that women should be biased to treat these displays as displays 
and preferentially show willingness to accept them from desirable prospective 
partners. To this end we had female participants play Trust Games with counterparts 
varying in sex and attractiveness. 
As behaviour within gender roles is circumscribed it is not enough to find that 
women show differential behaviour toward the sexes we also need to consider the 
effects of attractiveness on behaviour.  
If women have a bias to interpret male generosity with money as courtship effort 
there will be a difference between the effect of counterpart attractiveness on 
participant’s trust and reciprocation decisions. Trust decisions will be unaffected by 
this bias. Reciprocation decisions with female counterparts should also be 
unaffected by this bias. Decisions whether to reciprocate or exploit male trust, 
however, may be a decision whether to accept his investment and as such female 
participants should prefer to accept investment from more attractive male 
counterparts. 
From this we predicted two things about the effect of counterpart attractiveness. 
First, that a ‘halo’ effect would increase cooperation in all conditions (particularly 
trust decisions as discussed in Chapter 3). Second, that participants would 
reciprocate less with attractive male counterparts (i.e. accept investment).  
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Experiment: Trust Games (Female Choice) 
Participants 
74 female participants were recruited from an undergraduate psychology class at the 
University of St Andrews. Data was restricted to heterosexual participants (N = 70, 
mean age = 21.1, s.d. = 1.81). 
Images 
50 males and 50 females (white; aged 18-25) were photographed in neutral pose. 
Forty one participants (17 male/24 female; mean age = 21, s.d. = 3.29) rated the 
facial images for attractiveness on a Likert-type scale of 1–7. Images were masked 
(to exclude hair and clothing) and presented in random order. The attractiveness of 
each facial image was calculated as the mean rating for that face across all 
participants. The reliability of attractiveness ratings was very high (Cronbach’s α > 
0.9). 
Experiment Procedure 
The binary choice version of the Trust Game as outlined in Chapter 1 was used. 
The protocol followed was exactly as in Chapter 4.  
Analysis 
Facial images were previously rated for attractiveness as described above. Facial 
images were ranked by rated attractiveness and split into high and low groups. 
Participants played trust or reciprocation game roles with faces that were split for 
analysis into male or female, and high or low attractiveness.  
Eight scores were calculated for each participant; Four scores for ‘trust’ decisions 
calculated as the proportion of trust decisions made with the 12 most attractive and 
with the 12 least attractive male images and the same proportions with the 12 most 
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and least attractive female images. Four scores were also calculated for these 12 
image groups for ‘reciprocation’ decisions as well. 
Self-rated attractiveness was split at the mean (mean = 4.01), scores of 1-4 were 
treated as low attractiveness and 5-7 as high attractiveness. 
Results 
Participants trusted 48% (range = 14% to 98%, SD = 14%) of their counterparts and 
reciprocated with 72% (range = 4% to 100%, SD = 20%) of their counterparts.  
Player one: Trust decisions 
Predictions were tested by 2-way ANOVA with the factors: sex of image (2 levels) 
and attractiveness (2 levels). 
Participants showed a significant main effect from the attractiveness of the images 
(F1,69 = 65.2, p < .0005, see fig. 5-1). More attractive individuals were more trusted. 
However, as predicted there was no significant effect from the sex of the images 
(F1,69 = 2.9, p = .10) nor any interaction between image sex and attractiveness (F1,69 = 
0.3, p = .59). Female participants are equally affected by attractiveness with both 
male faces and female faces (Fig. 5-1).  
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Figure 5-1 - Participants trust attractive faces. Participants trust attractive faces but show neither 
significant sex preference nor any sex dependant response to attractiveness. 
 
When including self-rated attractiveness in the analysis as a between subject factor 
previous effects are found with no moderating effects from self-ratings (all p > .47). 
Player two: Reciprocation 
Hypotheses were tested by 2-way ANOVA with the factors: sex of image (2 levels) 
and attractiveness (2 levels). 
Main effects were found from the sex of image (F1,69 = 4.1 p = .048, see fig. 5-2) and 
image attractiveness (F1,69 = 11.6, p < .005, see fig. 5-2). However, these also interact 
(F1,69 = 40.3 p < .0005, see fig. 5-2). While more attractive images elicit more 
reciprocation overall, this is true when considering female faces alone (t70 = -6.5, p < 
0.0005). For male images, the opposite is true; low attractive male faces elicit more 
reciprocation than attractive male faces (t70 = 2.5, p = 0.013). The high attractive 
group of male faces is also made from a set of faces which are rated significantly 
more masculine, healthier and more trustworthy than the low attractive group. This 
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runs counter to an interpretation that females may avoid threat of punishment or 
expect untrustworthiness from more attractive male counterparts. 
 
Figure 5-2 - Participants exploit trust from attractive males but not from attractive females 
Women reciprocate more with female counterparts and with more attractive counterparts. However, 
this is qualified by an interaction. Male attractiveness elicits less reciprocation. 
 
When including self-rated attractiveness in the analysis as a between subject factor 
previous effects are found with no moderating effects from self-ratings (all p > .45). 
Discussion: Women Exploit the Trust of Attractive Men 
As we predicted, participants in our trust games were influenced by an 
attractiveness ‘halo’ and were significantly more cooperative with more attractive 
counterparts. However, while we predicted that a bias to accept investment from 
attractive males would moderate this effect we were surprised to observe that the 
‘halo’ effect disappeared and that female participants were significantly more likely 
to exploit the trust of more attractive males. 
Participants increase non-reciprocation with male images compared with female 
images in support of the interpretation that women respond to male ‘trust’ as 
display of wealth and generosity. This interpretation would be tentative were it not 
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further supported by the fact that women show more exploitation of more attractive 
male faces than unattractive. It should be heavily emphasised that this is an unlikely 
result. Attractiveness elicits positive responses and increased cooperation (Langlois, 
et al., 2000). That our female participants’ exploit attractive males rather than 
reciprocate with them is very surprising.  
This result suggests that when playing the Trust Game these female participants 
perceived some payoff structure outwith the game that is specifically modulated by 
male attractiveness; in the Trust Game payoff matrix (Table 1-2) there are values of P 
and Q which intereact with male counterpart attractiveness. We suggest that female 
participants see male ‘trust’ as advertising and either exploit it (Q) with the payoff of 
encouraging further social interaction or reciprocate (P) in order to discourage 
further social interaction. 
As females make greater investment in offspring (Trivers, 1972) and therefore have 
more to lose in making a poor choice of reproductive partner it is to be expected 
that evolved female psychology should include mechanisms not only of mate 
preference and choice but of strategic control of interactions with male strangers 
(Grammer, 1990). If male ‘trust’ in these games is used as a signal of interest in 
attractive females, and this would seem to be the case in the last chapter, it is 
reasonable to interpret female exploitation of male ‘trust’ as a reciprocal signal of 
interest in ongoing social interaction and reciprocation of male ‘trust’ as a signal of a 
lack of interest. 
In summary, we found that female participants appear to recognise that male ‘trust’ 
in Trust Games has at least some component of sexual display and are more likely to 
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keep the game interaction a fair one with less attractive male counterparts and more 
likely to exploit more attractive male counterparts (perhaps obligating themselves to 
further interaction). 
We tested this interpretation further by asking participants to make similar decisions 
within an explicitly sexual context.
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Chapter 6  
 
Food sharing and sex 
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Abstract: Food sharing is commonly practiced in human society as a form of 
cooperative exchange of resources. Humans also exchange resources during courting 
to obtain romantic partners out of a competitive mating market. Providing resources 
is one way a male can increase his ability to attract a female, and food can be a 
commodity that could be exchanged with a potential mating partner. Studies on 
other animals have shown relationships between food sharing and sex, and other 
exchange markets with sex. In this present study, we explored human mating 
markets in relationship to food sharing by studying payment choices for hypothetical 
romantic dates. First, we questioned participants about their preference to pay the 
food bill on a hypothetical dinner date. We then investigated whether any 
preferences were related to a partner’s facial attractiveness, or the participant’s 
perception of their mate value in a mating market (i.e., perceived value relative to 
others). Our results indicated that female participants preferred male dates to pay 
more than males preferred females to pay. Females also preferred to have males 
that had higher facial attractiveness pay for them. In contrast, male participants 
showed a greater willingness to pay for dates that had higher facial attractiveness. 
Higher self-rated attractiveness in females was related to preferences for the male to 
pay, while in males self-rated attractiveness was related to preferences to not pay 
the entire bill. These results support that the decision to pay for the food bill during a 
date was influenced by factors related to a person’s competitive ability in a mating 
market. Individuals showed exchange strategies consistent with sexual selection 
theory and the relative mate quality of themselves and hypothetical partners. 
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The trade of food from males to females for access to sexual opportunity, be it 
immediate exchange or a long-term relationship based on a series of exchanges is 
predicted from sexual selection theory (Darwin, 1871; Kappeler & van Schaik, 2004; 
Trivers, 1972).  
Human beings share food in cooperative exchange relationships, including sexual 
bonding (Bliege Bird, Bird, Smith, & Kushnick, 2002; Gurven, 2004; Moore, 1984). 
Men that can provide more food resources in traditional societies tend to be 
‘showing off’ at least in part to attract mating attention (Wood & Hill, 2000) and they 
tend to be preferred by females as mating partners, and have more offspring (Smith, 
2004). There is evidence of a direct meat-for-sex trade in traditional societies such as 
the Sharanahua (see Gurven, 2004; Siskind, 1973, p. p. 103)  
In general, females are attracted to males that can provide resources that will 
sustain both them and their offspring (Buss, 1989; Trivers, 1972).  As a consequence 
of such trades, human romantic relationships seem to be influenced by the 
conditions of a mating market where partners are chosen based on their quality as a 
partner relative to others in the market (Pawlowski & Dunbar, 1999). Males are 
chosen by females for their ability to provide physical resources, and females are 
chosen by males for their current reproductive condition and ability to produce and 
care for offspring (Buss, 1989). Generosity is attractive in both sexes (Farrelly, et al., 
2007). 
Self-evaluation and market value 
Individuals evaluate their own mate value relative to others, and this provides a 
subjective gauge of their ability to attract a romantic partner. A number of studies 
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have shown that attractiveness relates to one’s ability to obtain romantic dates (De 
Vries, et al., 2008; Kurzban & Weeden, 2005; Walster, et al., 1966; Woll & Young, 
1989). Self-perceived attractiveness should therefore reflect an individual’s 
perception of their mate value. Since we expect market influences to play a factor in 
mate selection, self-assessment of value should be related to the qualities and 
individual demands from partners (i.e., more attractive people will be more 
demanding of their partner).  
Attractiveness does seem to affect the qualities individuals seek from a partner. For 
example, females with lower waist-to-hip ratios that also scored low on measures of 
anxiety, depression and stress showed a higher preference for male physical 
indicators of male health (Jones, Little, et al., 2005). Females with lower waist-to-hip 
ratios and high scores for facial attractiveness showed preferences for more 
masculine male faces for long-term relationships (Penton-Voak, et al., 2003). Also, 
self-rated attractiveness in women has been shown to relate to preferences for facial 
masculinity and symmetry (i.e., attractiveness) in partners (Little, et al., 2001). Lastly, 
one study demonstrated that female self-rated attractiveness was influenced 
relative to the attractiveness of female images that they were shown and that this 
manipulated their preferences of male facial masculinity (Little & Mannion, 2006). 
Females that observed images of attractive females downgraded their self-
evaluation and showed reduced preferences for masculine males. Those who 
observed unattractive images upgraded their self-evaluation and showed increased 
preference for masculine males. This effect shows clearly how the immediate market 
conditions might influence a female’s perception of her mate value or competitive 
ability in a market of other females. 
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There is little investigation on male self-perceived attractiveness but in one study, 
according to Little et al. (personal communication), males showed increased 
preference for female facial femininity if they consider themselves to be more 
attractive. It has also been argued that high-quality males are less likely to invest in 
mates and instead pursue a strategy of maximising their number of lifetime mates 
(Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). This is supported in that more physically attractive 
males are more likely to have more short-term sexual relationships than less 
attractive males (Rhodes, et al., 2005). As with females, it seems the self-evaluation 
of males can influence how they select and invest in female partners in a mating 
market  
In the present study, we used sexual selection and market theory to generate several 
predictions about male and female preferences for who will pay for the food 
following a dinner date (i.e., provide and share the food). Based on sexual selection 
theory, women should be more selective and therefore we expect females to prefer 
males to pay for dates and males to be more willing to pay than females.  
Also, individuals should evaluate their potential partners based on attractiveness, as 
a possible cue of genetic quality. Therefore, we expect that attractiveness will 
influence preferences. We expect men to prefer to pay for the meal with more 
attractive females, and women will be more likely to test attractive males to 
determine their ability and willingness to provide resources. We predict women will 
be less interested in unattractive males and therefore, females might refrain from 
engaging in any exchanges that might communicate the possibility of romantic 
interaction. In compensation for this, these males should be more willing to pay for 
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the date in an effort to establish an exchange. Lastly, attractive females will 
capitalize on the market and be more likely to request resources i.e. prefer others to 
pay, as they are more likely to be able to acquire them from a male. 
These predictions allowed us to test whether preferences for providing food on a 
date were related to relative partner value in a mating market. Since our data was 
collected from hypothetical cases though, we did not evaluate actual food-mating 
exchanges. Consequently, we were not able to test the outcome of food provisioning 
exchanges on human mating, only the preferences surrounding them. 
Experiment: Payment Preferences on Dates  
Participants 
A total of 2,280 participants took part in an online experiment, of which we included 
only participants who (a) completed all parts of the experiment and (b) reported that 
they had taken the time to answer questions honestly. Also, as we are interested in 
mating behaviour we included only participants who (c) were heterosexual, and (d) 
were clearly of reproductive age; within an age range of 20 to 35 years old. This 
reduced the number to 245 male [mean age = 26.2(S.D. 4.5) years] and 171 female 
[mean age = 25.2(S.D. 4.4) years] participants.  
Procedure 
After giving consent, participants filled in a basic demographic questionnaire 
including age, sex and sexual orientation. They were asked to rate how attractive 
they considered themselves to be on a Likert-type scale of 1 = very unattractive to 7 
= very attractive. Participants were then given the following instructions:  
“You will now be shown a series of facial images in two 
blocks. You should imagine that you have been out for 
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Male Facial Images 
 
Female Facial Images 
a meal with the individual in the photograph. There are 
then three options for paying the bill at the end of the 
meal. You have to decide what you would prefer: to 
pay for both of you, to split the bill in half or for the 
other person to pay for the meal.” 
We presented participants with 12 opposite sex facial images (in randomised order) 
and asked who they would prefer to pay the bill.  
Stimuli 
Each image presented was a composite of 3 same sex facial photographs (See 
Tiddeman, Burt, & Perrett, 2001 for computer graphics techniques). The composite 
images were made from images selected from a set of neutrally posed images [50 
male and 50 female – age 20.4(S.D. 1.6) years].  
The composite images were ranked for attractiveness by 28 participants [age 
21.6(S.D. 4.4) years; 10 male/18 female; Cronbach’s alpha > .93] who were not 
otherwise included in this study (see Figure 6-1 for composite images and final 
ranking). 
Figure 6-1 – Stimuli images ordered left to right for attractiveness. 
Analysis 
For each image the participants had to answer how they would prefer the bill for the 
hypothetical meal to be paid. Answers were scored as -1 = other pays, 0 = split the 
bill and 1 = participant pays for the meal.  
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Spearman’s correlations were calculated between participant’s self-reports and 
mean scores and between mean responses elicited by images and image 
attractiveness rank. 
To test for interactions between image attractiveness and participants’ self-reported 
attractiveness we split the images and participants by sex and analysed the 
participant preferences for payment by mixed ANOVAs with three levels of the 
within-subject variable (i.e. mean response to four least attractive images, four most 
attractive and the four middle images) and three levels of the between-subject 
variable (i.e. self-rated attractiveness). 
As the participant self-rated attractiveness variable was negatively skewed, 
participants were allocated to three attractiveness levels; self-rated attractiveness 
values of 1-4 were allocated to the low-attractiveness group (male: 81; female: 59), a 
rating of 5 to the mid-attractiveness group (male: 92; female: 63) and a self rating of 
6 or 7 to the high-attractiveness group (male: 71; female: 49). 
Results 
Most often participants preferred to split the bill (58%) and both sexes report a 
mean preference not to pay for the meal, -0.4(S.D. 0.35) for females and -0.07(S.D. 
0.46) for males. Still, female participants preferred the opposite sex to pay for the 
meal more often than males, indicating a significant sex difference in choice (Mann-
Whitney: U171, 245 = 12085, p < .0005, see Fig. 2). Our results show that neither sex 
prefers to pay the bill, but that females have a higher tendency to prefer meals to be 
paid by their date. 
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Figure 6-2 - Sex difference in payment preference for ‘dinner dates.’ Females show a stronger 
preference than males for the opposite sex to pay for the meal. 
Self-Rated attractiveness and payment 
Participants’ mean reported preference correlated with the participants’ self-rated 
attractiveness (Male: rs = -.13 N = 244, p = .046; Female: rs = -.17 N = 171, p = .026). 
The self-rated attractiveness of participants of both sexes was related to preferences 
for the opposite sex to pay for the meal.  
Image attractiveness and payment  
The mean reported preference for each image correlated with image attractiveness 
rank.  
Female image attractiveness rank strongly correlated with the average reported 
male preference to pay for the dinner date (Spearman’s rho:  rs = .90, N = 12, p < 
.0005). Men more frequently preferred to pay for dates with more attractive 
females.  
Reported Preferences for Payment of 
'Dinner Date' with Opposite Sex
Female 
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Male image attractiveness negatively correlated with the mean female reported 
preference to pay for the dinner date (Spearman’s rho: rs = -.80, N = 12, p < .005). 
Female participants more frequently preferred the male to pay with more attractive 
males.  
Attractiveness interactions 
We analysed the data with 2 mixed ANOVAs with 3 levels of image attractiveness 
and 3 levels of self-rated attractiveness.  
Male participants: The ANOVA showed a main effect of the images’ attractiveness 
(F2,482 = 284, p < .0005), with no interaction between the attractiveness of the images 
and the self-rated attractiveness of participants (F4,482 = 1.6, p  = .17). This analysis 
also showed a between subjects effect of self-rated attractiveness (F2,241 = 3.9, p = 
.022, see Figure 6-3& Figure 6-4).  
Female participants: The ANOVA showed a main effect of the images’ attractiveness 
(F2,336  = 7.9, p < .0005), with no interaction between the attractiveness of the images 
and the self-rated attractiveness of the participants (F4,336  = 1.1, p = .33). This 
analysis also showed a between-subject effect of self-rated attractiveness (F2,168  = 
3.3, p = .038, see Figure 6-3& Figure 6-4). 
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Figure 6-3 – Self-rated attractiveness predicts a shift in preference of both sexes toward the opposite 
sex paying for the meal. Both male and female participants are more likely to prefer the opposite sex 
to pay for the meal if they consider themselves to be attractive. 
 
Our hypotheses based upon sexual selection were confirmed. We found that both 
female and male participants modified their preferences for the opposite sex to pay 
for their meal in line with their evaluation of their own attractiveness. Self-reported 
attractiveness (an estimate of mate-value) in both male and female participants 
relates positively to a preference for the other to pay for the meal.  
Also, while both male and female participants modified their preferences in line with 
the attractiveness of the observed images they did so in the predicted directions. 
Male participants show more willingness to pay for more attractive compared with 
less attractive females whereas female participants would prefer the more attractive 
males to pay for them compared with less attractive males. 
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Figure 6-4 – Male participants offer to pay for attractive females; female participants prefer to be 
paid for by attractive males. There is a significant effect of facial attractiveness on the payment 
preferences of both male and female participants but in opposite directions. 
Discussion: Preferences Predicted by Mating Market  
In our sample, patterns of human preferences for payment in romantic dates 
conform to predictions derived from a mating market framework based on sexual 
selection theory in three ways. First, females significantly more often reported a 
preference for males to pay than males preferred the females to pay. Second, 
participants’ self-rated attractiveness predicted their preference for their date to pay 
for the meal. Third, the attractiveness of the date had opposite effects on the 
reported preferences of male and female participants. Male participants were more 
willing to pay for more attractive dates, while female participants preferred that 
more attractive dates pay for them.  
In other work on mate-value it is common to find data with a U or hump shaped 
pattern. As market value is a trade-off between various parameters there is likely to 
be an optimal trade at the top of the inverted U (e.g. age in Pawlowski & Dunbar, 
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1999). We might have expected a U-shaped distribution of female preferences in our 
data as females may have be willing to pay in order to gain social access to males 
with extreme good looks. The data, however, does not show this pattern; female 
preferences are linearly related to male attractiveness. It is possible that this is 
because we asked about preferences rather than expectations. If, rather than asking 
who they would prefer to pay, we had asked who participants thought would pay at 
the end of the meal we may have found something more like a U-shape as the 
particpants may want the most attractive males to show interest in them and pay 
but nevertheless recognise that they may end up paying themselves.  
Women prefer to have their meals paid for by men in proportion to their own mate 
value. If payment acceptance indicates sexual interest then women with higher mate 
value (more attractive women) more often indicate sexual interest. While we would 
not want to say that an indication of sexual interest leads directly to coitus – a 
second date is the more likely next step – there is evidence that female self-rated 
attractiveness correlates with a less restricted attitude to short-term relationships 
(Clark, 2004) and at the same time, men rate the faces of women with more 
unrestricted attitudes to short-term relationships as more attractive (Boothroyd, 
Jones, Burt, & Perrett, 2008). Our data here would be consistent with attractive 
women (compared with less attractive women) actively wanting and therefore 
indicating their preference for short-term relationships but it would also be 
consistent with attractive women more often indicating that they want a second 
date and therefore placing themselves more often in contexts where the 
relationships (long or short-term) they would choose are possible.  
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We conjecture therefore that the commodity offered by females is social access such 
as the second date. If this is true then the reported preferences for payment should 
predict reported preferences for a second date. Women should therefore trade-off 
payment for the meal against facial attractiveness. This should have the effect that 
while women should be willing to go on a second date with the most attractive 
males and unwilling with the least attractive males whether they pay for the meal or 
not, the average attractive males are likely to get a second date if they pay and not if 
they don’t. Investigating participant payment preferences for meals on a second 
date would also allow greater contrast with other explanatory mechanisms such as 
reciprocity. We plan to test these hypotheses in future experiments.  
On the basis of the results here we would also predict that other demographic 
variables should effect similar results. Items such as male social or physical 
dominance, masculinity, prestige, socio-economic status and age should predict male 
self-evaluations of mate value and therefore willingness to pay for meals. As a 
corollary, in contradiction to expectations that as sexual economic inequality reduces 
so should expectations for the men to pay, if the mating market interpretation of our 
data is correct the socio-economic status of women should predict women’s 
preferences to be paid for. Women with higher socio-economic status should 
consider themselves to have higher mate value [albeit that males consider female 
status a luxury rather than necessary value as mentioned above (Li, et al., 2002)] and 
therefore should demand more male investment; women with higher salaries should 
report a higher preference for men to pay for the meal than women with lower 
salaries (at least on the first date) and should perhaps expect that meal to be more 
costly. Indeed, in work by Waynforth and Dunbar (Waynforth & Dunbar, 1995) 
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comparing between socio-economic groups men from a wealthier group emphasise 
female attractiveness whereas women from a poorer group emphasise family 
commitment. We may therefore expect that higher status would effect stronger sex 
specific preferences. 
In conclusion, we found that women preferred male dates to pay (especially when 
those dates were attractive males) and men showed a willingness to pay for female 
dates (especially when those dates were attractive females) and that both men and 
women modulated their preference in line with self-perceived mate value; Self-rated 
attractiveness in both sexes predicted a shift in preference toward the opposite sex 
paying for the meal.  
These effects of attractiveness on dating preferences support the notion that 
payment and acceptance of payment on dates is recognised by both sexes as a 
display of sexual interest in a mating market. Individuals show financial choices in 
this mating market that are adaptive to evaluations of their own quality and that of 
prospective partners. 
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Section 2 Summary: 
 
In Trust Games men make a display of pro-social behaviour, especially with attractive 
women. Women are more likely to exploit this display from attractive men and keep 
interactions with less attractive men on a reciprocal basis. Men also seem to show a 
preference to display investment strategies with attractive women in a dating 
context and women show an increased preference to accept this investment from 
more attractive men. Both men and women modulate their preferences in line with 
their own self-perceived mate-value; if they consider themselves to be attractive 
they more often prefer their date to pay for them. Trust game behaviour is 
modulated by inter-sexual competition. 
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Section 3 
 
Competition and Sexual Selection  
We present evidence for competition effects on trust and trustworthiness. All 
participants’ behaviour is related to counterpart level of circulating testosterone. 
From previous chapters we saw that less dominant males (who are not necessarily 
less attractive) pay more attention to female attractiveness than do more dominant 
males when making trust decisions. More dominant males are also less reciprocating 
with other males; they may be able to afford to ‘play the game’ because they are 
likely to win in any aggressive interaction and therefore have less need of social 
alliance.  
Chapter 7: Facial cues to circulating testosterone are predictive of others responses. 
Chapter 8: Male variation in facial width to height ratio predicts how trustworthy 
males are in playing games and is also used by others as a cue whether to trust 
males.  
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Chapter 7  
 
Testosterone and Trust Games 
 
  
 P a g e  | 104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Individuals with high basal testosterone tend to be more aggressive 
(Archer, 1991) and in economic games are more likely to punish unfair offers 
(Burnham, 2003). Therefore economic game players with access to facial information 
should be both less willing to choose to play games with higher testosterone 
counterparts and also less willing to play unfairly with higher testosterone 
counterparts. We tested this prediction in ‘trust games’ where participants decided 
whether or not to trust and to reciprocate the trust of counterparts depicted as 
static faces. As predicted we found participants’ decisions whether or not to trust 
counterparts were related to counterpart’s testosterone; higher testosterone 
counterpart faces were trusted less frequently (although this was not replicated in 
expt. 2). Also as predicted, participants more frequently reciprocated the trust of 
counterparts with high salivary testosterone than that of counterparts with lower 
salivary testosterone. This may indicate that players perceive cues to counterpart 
testosterone and avoid the possible increased costs of interaction and reactive-
aggression with higher testosterone counterparts.  
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The main mechanism of sexual selection other than partner choosiness is direct 
same-sex competition. We were therefore very interested in measures of dominance 
and/or aggression and how these were implicated in individual differences in game 
play.  
We saw in Chapter 4 that males who reported higher physical dominance – i.e. that 
they would win a physical fight with a same-sex peer – were less biased by female 
attractiveness in their game decisions (see Figure 4-3) and were less reciprocating 
with other males (see Figure 4-5) than were those males who reported a lower 
physical dominance. We predicted these results because more dominant males 
should have less need to display cooperation in order to gain female attention and 
would have less need to cooperate to gain resources. These two results should be 
separated because direct competition between males would result from intra-sexual 
competition whereas variation in male sexual display toward females would be a 
result of inter-sexual competition (and male advertising as a secondary effect). 
Also as discussed in Chapter 4 similar phenomena have been seen by other 
researchers such as male fluctuating asymmetry predicted Ultimatum Game offers 
(Zaatari & Trivers, 2007) and male physical attractiveness predicted a lack of 
cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma, Allocator Choice, Faith, and Trust Games 
(Takahashi, et al., 2006). Our presented data is supportive of the contention by 
Zaatari and Trivers that males in better or stronger physical condition may have 
“superior ability in obtaining resources, especially in situations involving aggression” 
(2007). The more physically able males gain less from strategic alliances with others 
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than do weaker males. They may be able to use aggression and coercion more easily 
and would therefore be less cooperative. 
The hormone testosterone is implicated in increased aggression and behaviours 
aimed at achieving or maintaining high status (Archer, 1991; Mazur & Booth, 1998; 
Olweus, et al., 1980; Zitzmann & Nieschlag, 2001). Testosterone is also linked to 
facial characteristics in that ratings of masculinity in male faces are predicted by 
measure of salivary testosterone (Penton-Voak & Chen, 2004) and facial masculinity 
and testosterone level interact with competitive game outcomes (Pound, et al., 
2009). In addition to this testosterone is related to economic game behaviour as 
males with higher circulating testosterone are more likely to punish unfair economic 
game offers than are individuals with lower circulating testosterone (Burnham, 
2003).  
We therefore predict that participants will allow facial cues to underlying circulating 
testosterone to modify their behaviour when playing economic games. We expected 
that the faces of higher testosterone males may elicit a differential response in trust 
and reciprocity from others. 
We also tested for the effect with female faces. Similar effects of testosterone, or at 
least masculinity, are to be found in women. It is a consistent effect that men are 
more interested in casual sex than women (Oliver & Hyde, 1993). Mikach and Bailey 
(1999) compared two samples of women; one sample was taken from women who 
had had a typical number of lifetime sex partners (mean = 4.1) and another sample 
from women with a considerably greater number of lifetime sex partners (mean = 
57.5) than average. They found that these groups did not differ in attractiveness, 
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family background or self-esteem. The women with more lifetime partners were, 
however, also rated as more masculine and self-described themselves as masculine 
and more often reported childhood behaviour as being a ‘tom-boyish.’ Mikach and 
Bailey made no testosterone measures but suggest; “both unrestricted 
sociosexuality and masculine gender identity and role [may be] indicators of an 
underlying masculinization [sic] of the brain” (p149).  
Testosterone appears to be an explanatory factor for such male-typical behaviours. 
Testosterone is a component determining face preferences within individuals. 
Welling et al (2007) demonstrated that when making attractiveness judgements for 
male faces across the female cycle, females show an increase in preference for 
masculine male faces over feminine male faces when circulating testosterone is 
higher than at other points in the cycle (and other hormones are constant). A 
preference for more masculinity in males would be consonant with increased risk-
taking and a reduced restriction in attitude to casual sex.  
Physiological effects of testosterone could to some extent explain more masculine 
behaviours in women. Schreiner-Engel et al. (1981) found positive correlations 
between female salivary testosterone levels and genital response to erotic stimuli in 
the laboratory. Tuiten et al (1996) confirm testosterone as a mechanism for this, 
rather than a correlate, when they found that genital response was increased in 
amenorrheic women by testosterone administration. The North American 
Menopause Society (2005) has also found positive enhancement of sexual function 
in menopausal women with regard to desire, arousal, and orgasm with application of 
topical testosterone over that driven by placebo. 
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Raised testosterone in women does not only increase male-typical attitudes in 
women with regard to sex. Dabbs et al (2002) show that participants of both sexes 
describe feelings of increased arousal and, most noteworthy here, aggression. 
Participants scored more highly on implicit-attitude measures of arousal and 
aggression when their testosterone level is increased by application of testosterone 
gels to the skin when compared with a placebo. The placebo condition also showed 
significantly greater self-report and implicit measures of arousal and aggression than 
participants who ingested liquorice capsules (which lowers testosterone). The effects 
were stronger for women that for men. This supports the idea that just as high 
average basal testosterone males tend to be aggressive (Archer, 1991) high 
testosterone females are likely to be similarly aggressive and dominance seeking. 
These reported effects of testosterone upon female physiology and behaviour 
support the contention that testosterone has similar effects upon females and 
males. It is therefore likely, although not demonstrated, that naturally occurring 
variation in testosterone amongst women may also affect female facial appearance 
in a way that allows prediction of behaviour. Given that male testosterone measures 
predict ultimatum game punishment for unfair behaviour (Burnham, 2003) it is likely 
that female circulating testosterone measures and facial correlates would also 
predict punishment.  
Predictions with regard to the effect of testosterone on Trust Game behaviour were 
as follows. 1) Higher testosterone individuals are likely to be more aggressive, 
possibly hostile; players may avoid this interaction and decide not to trust higher 
testosterone individuals although not being trusted in a trust game increased 
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testosterone in men (Zak, Borja, Matzner, & Kurzban, 2005) which may suggest a 
reverse causation, that males who are not trusted, for whatever reason, have higher 
levels of testosterone. We, nevertheless, predict that higher testosterone faces will 
be trusted less than lower testosterone faces. 2) Failing to reciprocate when trusted 
in the reciprocation role does implicate an unfair action and higher testosterone 
individuals would be motivated to punish (or at least reward less) such behaviour. 
Although there is no opportunity to punish unfair behaviour in our game we predict 
that game players may operate with a heuristic that biases them against playing 
unfairly with higher testosterone counterparts. We predicted that participants would 
reciprocate trust more often with higher testosterone individuals. 
Experiment 1: Testosterone and Trust (St Andrews Images) 
Stage 1 – Images and Hormones 
50 female and 50 male St Andrews students (white; aged 18-25) attended for the 
hormone assay and were also photographed.  
The Hormone Assay: 
Female participants attended on two to four occasions. The interval between each 
test session was one week. On attendance the participants were instructed to first 
rinse their mouths with water and then salivate passively into the containers rather 
than chewing a wad of cotton wool to avoid possible inflation of the testosterone 
levels (Granger, Shirtcliff, Booth, Kivlighan, & Schwartz, 2004) or contamination with 
phytooestrogens. Participants had not eaten for at least an hour prior to testing 
sessions. Participants deposited between 3 and 5 mL of saliva by spitting directly into 
plastic pharmaceutical vials at the beginning of each testing session. The vials were 
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then sealed and frozen at -20°C. Although different participants were tested at 
different times of day each participant always attended at the same time of day. 
Hormonal assays were performed by the biological sciences lab at Queen Margaret 
University College (Edinburgh, UK). Salivary testosterone levels were determined by 
the ELISA method (Al-Dujaili, 2006; Sharp & AlDujali, 2004). The assay procedure was 
based on the indirect, competitive binding technique with samples first extracted 
using diethylether (the protocol is described in Welling, et al., 2007). Mean 
testosterone values across the multiple testing sessions were calculated. Average 
testosterone for the females = 96.82 pg/ml, N=50, SD = 51.58 pg/ml. These 
testosterone levels are within population norms for young adult females (see also 
Deady, Law Smith, Sharp, & AlDujali, 2006). 
Male participants attended between 1400 and 1500 hrs on more than one occasion 
each occasion being at least 24 hours apart. During the 5-10 minutes following 
arrival in the lab and experimental briefing participants were instructed in the same 
way as the female participants. Hormonal data were assayed in the same way as the 
female assays already mentioned. Mean testosterone values across the two testing 
sessions were calculated. Average testosterone for the whole sample = 259.73 
pg/ml, N=48, SD = 56.94 pg/ml. This is within the normal range for the QMU lab. 
Stage 2 – Attractiveness 
Forty one participants (17 male/24 female; mean age = 21, s.d. = 3.29) rated the 100 
facial images. Images were masked (to exclude hair and clothing) and presented in 
random order. Participants were white and aged 18–24. Each image was assessed on 
a likert-type scale of 1–7 for attractiveness. 
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Attractiveness for each facial image was calculated as the mean rating for that face 
across all participants. For all 41 raters the reliability of attractiveness ratings was 
high (Cronbach’s α > 0.9). 
Stage 3 – Trust game 
63 St Andrews students (14 male/49 female; mean age = 21.1, s.d. = 1.81) were 
recruited from an undergraduate psychology class at the University of St Andrews. 
These participants were recruited at least two years after those who supplied the 
images and hormone assays; it is therefore unlikely that participants would be 
familiar with their game counterparts. Participants took part in ‘two-person’ 
sequential trust games as described in chapter 1. 
Participants were given written instructions on how the game was played (see 
Appendix 1) and a flow chart of the game was present on screen throughout (See 
Appendix 2). The only information available to participants about their counterpart 
for each game was the presented masked images (to exclude hair and clothing). The 
games were split into two blocks by sex of facial image and these were played in 
random order. Within each block the images were also presented in random order. 
Each block of facial images were split randomly into two sets. 25 images were 
assigned to always play the counterpart to participants as player 1 and 25 images 
assigned to player 2. 25 filler images were also used to represent 25 counterparts 
who chose not to trust the participant.  
Participants did not play the games for real money but instead received course credit 
for taking part. 
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Experiment 1: Results 
In line with the literature participants in the trust game made decisions predicted by 
the attractiveness ratings of their counterpart’s image. Attractiveness ratings 
correlate with proportion of decisions to trust (N = 50, r = .54, p < .0005). Also 
participants decisions whether or not to reciprocate with a fair proportion of the £8 
as player 2 were significantly correlated with attractiveness ratings (N = 50, r = .40, p 
< .001). 
It is possible that testosterone measures will interact with attractiveness, therefore 
it is necessary to control for attractiveness in any exploration of the results. 
Male Faces: 
The mean proportion of decisions to trust as player 1 was 0.46 and the mean 
proportion of decisions to reciprocate trust as player 2 was 0.68. This is consistent 
with typical responses in the trust game (Camerer & Fehr, 2004).
Analyses of the results by face with Pearson 1-tailed correlations were carried out. 
We found no significant relationship between salivary testosterone and proportion 
of decisions to trust faces (N = 25, r = -0.07, p = .36). Neither did we find a significant 
relationship between salivary testosterone and the proportion of decisions to 
reciprocate (N = 25, r = -0.05, p = .40).  
Testing across all faces, testosterone measures and attractiveness ratings are not 
significantly correlated with each other (N = 49, r = .07, p = .34). The partial 
correlation between testosterone and proportion of trust and reciprocal response is 
not significant when controlling for attractiveness (Trust response; N = 25, df = 22, r 
= -0.12, p = .28; Reciprocation response; N = 25, df = 22, r = -0.06, p = .39).  
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Figure 7-1: Male faces, trust condition. 
 
However, analyses by participant showed significant results. We grouped faces by a 
median split on testosterone measure into greater and less than 250 pg/ml 
testosterone measures. See Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-3 for visualisation of differences 
between groups. Participants decided to trust faces in the lower testosterone group 
significantly more often (t = -3.08, df. = 62, p = .003; see Figure 7-2) There was a 
significant difference in proportion of decisions to reciprocate between the high and 
low testosterone faces with high testosterone faces eliciting more reciprocation (t = 
3.49, df. = 62, p = .001; see Figure 7-2). These groups are also significantly different 
in attractiveness but matching the groups for attractiveness by excluding the most 
attractive member of the high testosterone group increased the significance of the 
difference between low and high testosterone groups for reciprocation. This is the 
only pair in all experiments where difference in attractiveness could explain the 
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behavioural difference toward testosterone groups. There has not been time nor 
space to incorporate discussion of these analyses within the text. 
 
Figure 7-2 – Participants’ response to lower testosterone male faces was significantly more trusting 
than their response to higher testosterone male faces (t = -3.08, df. = 62, p = .003) and participants 
reciprocated less frequently with low testosterone male faces than with high testosterone male 
faces (t = 3.49, df. = 62, p = .001) 
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Figure 7-3: Male faces, reciprocation condition. 
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Female Faces: 
The mean proportion of decisions to trust as player 1 was 0.51 and the mean 
proportion of decisions to reciprocate trust as player 2 was 0.66. This is consistent 
with typical responses in the trust game (Camerer & Fehr, 2004).
Analyses of the results by face with Pearson 1-tailed correlations were carried out. 
We found no significant relationship between salivary testosterone and proportion 
of decisions to trust (N = 25, r = .03, p = .45). Neither did we find a significant 
relationship between salivary testosterone and the proportion of decisions to 
reciprocate (N = 25, r = .06, p = .39). 
Testing across all female faces, testosterone measures and attractiveness ratings are 
not significantly correlated with each other (N = 50, r = .12, p = .21). The partial 
correlation between testosterone and proportion of trust and reciprocal response is 
not significant when controlling for attractiveness (Trust response; N = 25, df = 22, r 
= 0.06, p = .5; Reciprocation response; N = 25, df = 22, r = 0.11, p = .31). 
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Figure 7-4: Female faces, trust condition. 
 
Analyses by participant showed significant results. We grouped faces by a median 
split on testosterone measure into greater and less than 80 pg/ml testosterone 
measures. See Figure 7-4 and Figure 7-6 for visualisation of differences between 
groups. Participants decided to trust faces in the lower testosterone group 
significantly more often (t = -4.46, df. = 62, p < .0005; see Figure 7-5) Supporting our 
second hypothesis there was a significant difference in proportion of decisions to 
reciprocate between the high and low testosterone groups (t = 2.09, df. = 62, p < .05; 
see Figure 7-5).  
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Figure 7-5 – Participants’ response to lower testosterone female faces was significantly more 
trusting than their response to higher testosterone female faces (t = -4.46, df. = 62, p < .0005) and 
participants reciprocated less frequently with low testosterone female faces than with high 
testosterone female faces (t = 2.09, df. = 62, p = .04) 
 
 
Figure 7-6: Female faces, reciprocation condition. 
 
These results clearly support our two hypotheses. Participants decide to trust lower 
testosterone faces of both sexes with greater frequency than they decide to trust 
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higher testosterone faces. Participants also decide to reciprocate trust more 
frequently with higher testosterone faces than with lower testosterone faces, again 
with both male and female faces. 
Participants were only rewarded with course credit for taking part in this 
experiment. Therefore, in this experiment, decision making heuristics that are 
completely unrelated to financial consequences could have been used by 
participants. In experiment 2 the participants receive financial reward for the 
outcome of the games.  
As the image set was drawn from St Andrews students it is also possible that 
participants may have had some experience of the individuals in the images. This is 
improbable as the students in the images were from previous years’ participants and 
the protocols offered participants the option of declaring previous knowledge of 
individuals on screen. In experiment 2 images of students from a different university 
were used. 
Experiment 2: Testosterone and Trust (Aberdeen Images) 
Stage 1 – Images and Hormones 
Participants were recruited in the Aberdeen area by means of an advertisement. 
Non-Caucasian faces were excluded on the basis that an ‘other-race’ effect might 
skew trust judgements. Some older participants were excluded on the basis that 
they were extreme outliers in age. Participants wearing make-up were also excluded. 
A few participants refused consent for use of their images in future studies. Fifty 
female participants were included. 
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Participants were photographed and had their circulating testosterone levels 
measured using a salivary assay. The photographs were rated for attractiveness. 
Photography: 
Participants were photographed using a digital Fujifilm Finepix S2Pro with a 60mm 
Nikon lens. The camera was set to ‘Aperture Priority’, with aperture at F16. 
Participants sat at a distance of 48cm from the camera. The light source was 
restricted to flash guns. Images were masked (to exclude hair and clothing) using 
Psychomorph (See Tiddeman, et al., 2001). 
The Hormone Assay: 
Protocols and analysis were carried out as per experiment 1.  
Mean testosterone values across the multiple testing sessions were calculated. 
Average testosterone for the whole sample = 109.88 pg/ml, N=50, SD = 66.39 pg/ml. 
(Group in decision to trust condition mean = 112.67 pg/ml, N=25, SD = 69.32 pg/ml; 
Group in decision to reciprocate condition mean = 107.1 pg/ml, N=25, SD = 64.64 
pg/ml). These testosterone levels are within population norms (see also Deady, et 
al., 2006).  
Stage 2 – Attractiveness 
Fifty three St Andrews students; 8 males (mean age = 20.75, S.D. = 0.75) and 45 
females (mean age = 21.09, S.D. = 2.15) assessed each facial image for attractiveness 
on a likert-type scale of 1–7. The images were presented in random order. The 
ratings were carried out as part of a larger study. Participants rated three blocks of 
stimuli in a randomised order: (a) these faces for attractiveness, (b) the perceived 
age of these faces and (c) the perceived age of skin patches cut from the cheek area 
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of these images. All stimuli within the blocks were also randomised in order of 
presentation. Only the attractiveness ratings are used here. 
Attractiveness for each facial image was calculated as the mean rating for that face 
across all participants. Attractiveness ratings for all 53 raters, Cronbach’s α = 0.978 
(female raters n=45, α = 0.975, male raters n=8, α = 0.884). 
Stage 3 – Trust game 
Participants from experiment 1 were recalled to take part in experiment 2. Eleven 
participants did not return. Fifty two participants (10 male/42 female; mean age = 
21.06, s.d. = 1.67) were recruited from an undergraduate psychology class at the 
University of St Andrews. Participants took part in a ‘two-person’ sequential trust 
game as described above.  
Participants had previously played the trust game in experiment 1 and were 
therefore familiar with the game but were unfamiliar with the images presented in 
this experiment consistent with the zero-acquaintance paradigm. 
Participants were given written instructions on how the game was played (see 
Appendix 1) and a flow chart of the game was present on screen throughout (See 
Appendix 2). The facial images were split into two sets of 25. One group of images 
was assigned to always play the counterpart to participants as player 1 and the other 
group assigned to play as player 2. 25 blank white filler images were also used to 
represent 25 counterparts who chose not to trust the participant. 
Participants were instructed that unlike in the previous set of games they would be 
playing for real money and that the outcome of the games would be dependant on 
their decisions and the previous decisions of their counterparts.  
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The outcome of each game was decided by participants where they were player 2 
and were randomised biased to previous play for games where participants trusted 
as player 1 (e.g. if counterpart previous reciprocated 90% there would be a 90% 
chance of reciprocation). Participants were paid according to the outcome of one of 
the games they played. 
 
Experiment 2: Results 
Upon comparing the proportion of decisions to trust by participants in experiment 1 
with their decisions to trust in experiment 2 we found that participants are 
consistent (t = 1.225, df. = 51, p = .226). The mean proportions of decisions to 
reciprocate, however, differed between experiments (t = 2.79, df. = 51, p = .007). 
Mean reciprocation fell from 67% in experiment 1 to 60% in experiment 2.  
The mean proportion of decisions to trust as player 1 was 0.45 and the mean 
proportion of decisions to reciprocate trust as player 2 was 0.60.  
Participants made decisions predicted by the attractiveness ratings of their 
counterpart’s image. Attractiveness ratings correlate with the average proportion of 
decisions to trust (N = 25, r = .66, p < .0005; see Table 7-1). Also the average of 
participants’ decisions whether or not to return a fair proportion of the £8 as player 
2 were significantly correlated with attractiveness ratings (N = 25, r = .54 p = .006; 
see Table 7-1). 
Like experiment 1 we found participants’ decisions whether or not to trust 
counterparts were unrelated to their counterpart’s testosterone level (N = 25, r = 
.22, p = .14). Unlike experiment 1, however, the average participants’ proportion of 
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decisions to reciprocate with their counterparts positively correlated with the 
salivary testosterone of their counterparts and participants returned £4 rather than 
£2 more often to individuals with higher testosterone assays (N = 25, r = .47 p = .019; 
see Table 7-1). 
 Decision to Trust Decision to Reciprocate 
Attractiveness r = 0.66, p < .000 r = 0.54, p < .01 
Testosterone r = 0.22, p = .285 r = 0.47, p = .019 
 
Table 7-1 - Participants place more trust in more attractive faces. Participants returned significantly 
more to more attractive and higher testosterone faces. 
 
As it is possible that higher testosterone females are also higher in attractiveness we 
checked whether this was a spurious result with partial correlations.  
Partialling out attractiveness the correlation between testosterone and proportion 
of reciprocation was significant (N = 25, df = 22, r = .57 p = .004). The effect of 
attractiveness was significant when testosterone measures were controlled (n = 25, 
df = 22 r = .62 p = .001). Testosterone and attractiveness ratings did not correlate (n 
= 50, r = .03, p = .825). 
Comparison by participant also showed significant results. Grouping faces by a 
median split on testosterone measure into greater and less than 106 pg/ml 
testosterone and comparing the mean reciprocation response by participant there 
was a significantly higher level of reciprocation toward high testosterone faces (t = -
4.96, df. = 51, p < .0005; see Figure 7-8). This is further support of our hypothesis 
that higher testosterone predicts higher reciprocation from others in trust games. 
See  Figure 7-9 for visualisation of differences between groups. 
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Figure 7-7: Female faces, trust condition. 
 
Testing by participants on a median split on testosterone of the images in the trust 
condition found no significance. Participants did not decide to trust lower 
testosterone faces more frequently than higher testosterone faces (t = -1.255, df. = 
51, p = .215; see Figure 7-8). See Figure 7-7 for visualisation of differences between 
groups. 
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Figure 7-8 – Participants showed no significant difference in trust toward high vs. low testosterone 
faces. However, response to higher testosterone faces was significantly more reciprocating than 
their response to lower testosterone faces. (t = -4.96, df. = 51, p < .0005) 
 
 
Figure 7-9: Female faces, reciprocation condition. 
 
Discussion 
In this study we replicate the findings of others that attractiveness is a determinant 
of both decisions to trust (Mulford, et al., 1998; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999) and 
decisions to reciprocate trust (Wilson & Eckel, 2006). 
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We hypothesised that testosterone should also be a determinant of these decisions. 
We find as predicted, that lower testosterone faces are more trusted by participants 
than are higher testosterone faces. This was a very strong effect in both the female 
and male faces of our first experiment. A possible reason for this not being wholly 
replicated in the second experiment is that as the second experiment was played 
with real money. Participants playing for real money in experiment 2 reciprocated 
less. With regard to trust decisions there is a motivation to mistrust those we think 
untrustworthy and therefore not trust the high testosterone face (as in experiment 
1) but where the game has real financial consequences (as in experiment 2) lack of 
trust in the second player has financial consequences and prevents the second 
player from earning an extra pound and could be construed as negative behaviour. 
In experiment 2 there may be reason to mistrust high testosterone individuals at the 
same time as reason to avoid punishment from them. This may explain the lack of a 
significant result. 
In both experiments, as predicted, we find that higher testosterone faces elicit a 
greater proportion of reciprocal responses than do lower testosterone faces. 
In the second role of the trust game the simple self-interested strategy is to always 
take the unfair proportion, in other words to never reciprocate. The participants do 
not know their counterparts and have no real reason to suppose that they will ever 
meet them subsequent to the games. However despite this, participants forgo the 
extra money available to them in order to play the game somewhat fairly. This is 
typical of participant behaviour in these games (Camerer & Fehr, 2004). The fact that 
level of counterpart’s testosterone predicts how likely participants are to reciprocate 
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combined with previously published results that testosterone predicts frequency of 
punishment (Burnham, 2003) seems to indicate that participants are operating with 
some expectation of further interaction and are avoiding punishment.  
Punishment may indeed be overt retribution for unfair behaviour but could also take 
the form of indirect social cost, perhaps the loss of ongoing social acceptance. 
Paunonen (2006) found that manipulations in descriptions of honesty associated 
with facial images would predict subsequent ratings for attractiveness, health, 
kindness and femininity. A forteriori, experience of actual unfair behaviour is likely to 
make counterparts rate participants as less attractive, healthy and kind. In other 
words, behaving in an unfair way may lead to later social exclusion or indeed 
physical punishment. Participants seem to behave with the heuristic that this 
matters more with higher testosterone counterparts. 
A weakness of our experiments here is the preponderance of female images and 
female participants. We would argue as we have above that testosterone should 
have similar behavioural effects in women as in men but these experiments would 
gain considerably from replication with male participants and images. We would 
predict that effects would be stronger in male – male interactions. 
Discussion: Testosterone Cues Less Trust but More Reciprocation 
Current circulating testosterone level modulates decisions in Trust Games. Male and 
female counterparts with higher testosterone level are less trusted and elicit greater 
reciprocation. An exception to this in our data was seen in experiment 2 where 
testosterone level showed no relationship with trust decisions. This may be due also 
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to players being wary of behaving uncooperatively with counterparts who had a 
raised testosterone level. 
All our results here may be explained as participants avoiding perceived reactive- 
aggressive interactions. 
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Chapter 8  
 
Male Facial Width and Trustworthiness 
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The following report (Previously published as Stirrat & Perrett, 2010) demonstrates 
further evidence of direct competition between males which influences decisions in 
Trust Games by exploring the relationship between Trust Game behaviour and a 
facial measure that has been shown to relate to male dominance and reactive-
aggression. The more physically robust males, those with high facial width to height 
ratios, are less trustworthy and moreover are seen as less trustworthy. It is 
reasonable to suppose that these more robust males are more likely to be more 
competent in agonistic interactions. 
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M. Stirrat and D.I. Perrett. Valid facial cues to cooperation and trust: Male facial 
width and trustworthiness. Psychological Science 21(3) 349-354 (2010)  
 
Abstract: Decisions about whom to trust are biased by stable facial traits such as 
attractiveness, similarity to kin and perceived trustworthiness. Research addressing 
the validity of facial trustworthiness or its basis in facial features is scarce and has 
inconsistent results. We measured male trustworthiness operationally in Trust 
Games where participants had options to collaborate for mutual financial gain or 
exploit for greater personal gain. We also measured facial (bizygomatic) width 
(scaled for face height) as this is a sexually dimorphic, testosterone-linked trait 
predictive of male aggression. We found that men with greater facial width were 
more likely to exploit the trust of others and that other players were less likely to 
trust male counterparts with wide rather than narrow faces (independent of their 
attractiveness). Moreover, manipulating this facial width ratio with computer 
graphics controlled attributions of trustworthiness, particularly for subordinate 
female evaluators. 
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The human face is perhaps the most salient source of interpersonal information, 
especially with strangers. We can judge extroversion and conscientiousness 
accurately from the face slightly above chance (Penton-Voak, et al., 2006). There is 
consensus in perceptions of facial trustworthiness (Zebrowitz, et al., 1996) but 
evidence for validity in these judgements is patchy. 
Decisions about whom we trust are biased by stable facial traits such as 
attractiveness (Wilson & Eckel, 2006), similarity to kin (Debruine, 2002) and 
perceived trustworthiness (van ’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008). There is some evidence that 
people can judge from a face whether someone would be at ease with deception 
(Berry, 1990; Bond, et al., 1994) although others have failed to replicate this result 
(Masip & Garrido, 2001) and have found either no correlation or a negative 
correlation between judgements of faces and objective measures of trustworthiness 
(Hassin & Trope, 2000; Zebrowitz, et al., 1996). Whereas transient expressions can 
support accurate evaluation of non-cooperation (Verplaetse, et al., 2007), and 
perceptions of trustworthiness seem to relate to facial expression (Oosterhof & 
Todorov, 2009) there is little evidence that biases based on stable facial traits are 
valid. 
There is evidence against the validity of judgements of facial trustworthiness. While 
attractive faces are trusted (Wilson & Eckel, 2006) male attractiveness (Takahashi, et 
al., 2006) and male symmetry (Zaatari & Trivers, 2007) predict less cooperative 
behaviour in economic games. Explanations for these facts have been put forward in 
terms of sexual selection for male dominance and sexual dimorphism. 
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Recently, a relationship has been found between male dominance, reactive-
aggression and variation in a facial metric. Weston, Friday and Lio (2007) have shown 
that human adults are sexually dimorphic in skull bizygomatic width corrected for 
upper facial height. Variation in human male bone growth, specifically cranial 
growth, is related to testosterone effects in adolescence (Verdonck, Gaethofs, 
Carels, & de Zegher, 1999). Carré and McCormick (2008) found that variation in facial 
width ratio predicted male participants’ other-rated dominance, reactive-aggression 
in the lab and number of ice hockey penalties.  
Reactive-aggression in Carré and McCormick (2008) was measured as the amount of 
times a participant punished counterparts for stealing their points in a point 
subtraction task. As such, this is a measure of a pro-social behaviour that has been 
called altruistic punishment (see Fehr & Gachter, 2002 for discussion). We reasoned 
that the ability to punish may be based in greater physical robustness or dominance 
which would reduce consequences from agonistic interactions. Such status may also 
lead to increased anti-social behaviour and reduced cooperation similar to that seen 
by Zaatari and Trivers (2007).  
We were therefore interested to explore whether male variation in facial width ratio 
relates to a) cooperation in economic games (experiment 1) and b) trust judgements 
of others (experiments 2 and 3). 
Experiment 1 – Male Trust and Reciprocation 
Participants 
One hundred and forty-three white heterosexual University of St Andrews students 
participated (107 female; mean age = 21.6, s.d. = 2.3, range = 18-35). 
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Stimuli 
A different set of fifty male and fifty female white University of St Andrews students 
(aged 18-25) were photographed in neutral pose one year before the current 
experiment. 
Procedure: Trust game 
Participants were informed that they would play a series of economic games for real 
money. They then gave consent, completed demographic questionnaires and were 
photographed. Participants were informed that the outcomes of their games would 
be dependent upon their decisions and the previous behaviour of their counterparts. 
We used a binary choice version of the Trust Game (Berg, et al., 1995; Huck, et al., 
2007).  
Participants played 49 games with male counterpart images and 50 games with 
female counterpart images. For each game the only information available about 
counterparts was a facial image masked to exclude hair and clothing. Images were 
split by sex into two blocks of games, counterbalanced in order of presentation and 
within each block images were randomly allocated for participants to make either 
the first or second move. 
The first mover chose between ending the game (each player gets £3) or entrusting 
money to their counterpart. If the first mover trusted the second then £2 is added 
and the second mover decided to either split the money fairly (each player gets £4) 
or unfairly (first mover gets £2, second mover gets £6). The first move is therefore an 
operational measure of trust and the second a measure of trustworthiness.  
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Before the games started participants ran through examples of possible games and 
possible pay-offs to familiarise them with possible outcomes. Participants reported 
counterparts they recognised. These trials were omitted from analysis. 
Participants were paid at an exchange rate of £1 for every £100 earned (earnings 
ranged from £3 to £6). 
Facial Measure 
Following the methodology of Carré and McCormick (2008) we measured and 
calculated the ratio of bizygomatic width to upper face height of participants from 
their photographs (see Figure 8-1).  
 
Figure 8-1 – Bizygomatic width and upper face height calculated from 2-D images. All measured 
images were aligned and scaled to the same horizontally level eye points. Bizygomatic width was 
calculated as the maximum horizontal distance from left facial boundary to right facial boundary. 
Upper face height was calculated as the vertical distance from the higher point of the upper lip to the 
highest point of the eyelids. Facial width ratio was calculated as width/height. 
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Analysis 
Participants’ play was summarised as the proportion of decisions to trust and the 
proportion of decisions to reciprocate with male images, female images and all 
images. Spearman correlations were calculated to test for a relationship between 
participant facial width ratio, trust and reciprocation.  
Results and Discussion 
Females, on average, trusted 45% and reciprocated with 69% of their counterparts. 
Female participant facial width ratio did not correlate with any of their Trust Game 
behaviour (see Table 8-1). 
Male participants trusted 51% of counterparts and reciprocated with 72% on 
average. Male participants’ facial width ratio showed no relation to trust decisions 
but did relate to decisions to reciprocate (rs = -0.4, N = 36, p = .015, prep = 0.94: Table 
8-1) – see online supplement for alternative analysis.  
Male participants with higher facial width ratio (wide faces) were more likely to 
exploit their counterparts’ trust than were males with lower facial width (slim faces). 
Table 8-1 - Correlations between participant facial width ratio and Trust Game behaviour. 
  All Images Male Images Female Images 
  rs p rs p rs P 
Male  
Players 
(n=36) 
Trust -0.25 0.14 -0.24 0.15 -0.19 0.26 
Reciprocation -0.40 0.015 -0.34 0.04 -0.41 0.013 
Female 
Players 
(n=107) 
Trust  0.13 0.17   0.09 0.35  0.13 0.16 
Reciprocation  0.16 0.10  0.10 0.29  0.15 0.11 
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In experiment 2 we tested whether participants’ judgements of trustworthiness 
related to variation in male facial width ratio. 
Experiment 2 – Perceived Trustworthiness 
Participants 
Sixty-two University of St Andrews students participated (17 males; mean age = 
20.32, s.d. = 1.5). 
Stimuli 
We presented images of 67 white male University of St Andrews students (mean age 
= 20.8, s.d. = 2.7) who attended at least 2 years prior to the participant cohort and 
were therefore unknown to participants. These images had been previously rated for 
attractiveness by 41 raters (17 males: mean age = 21). Facial width ratio measures 
followed experiment 1 (see Figure 8-1). 
Procedure: Trust game 
Trust Games were conducted as experiment 1 except that participants were assigned 
to play only as first mover for 67 games with male counterpart images presented in 
random order.  
Analysis  
We calculated the proportion of participants that trusted each image. 
We tested for normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnoff. Trust (p > 0.2, prep < 0.72), 
attractiveness (p = 0.07, prep = 0.85) and facial width ratio (p > 0.2, prep < 0.72) were 
all normally distributed. 
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Results and Discussion 
Images were trusted by 46% (sd. = 0.21) of participants on average. Decisions were 
consistent across participants (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88). 
A least-squares regression analysis revealed that facial width ratio predicts 16% of 
the variation in trust decisions (B = -3.96, d.f. = 66, R2 = 0.157, p = .001, prep = 0.99; 
see Figure 8-2) with wider faces trusted less.  
Image attractiveness negatively correlated with facial width ratio (R = -0.32, p < 0.01, 
prep = 0.96) and positively correlated with trust decisions (R = 0.54, p < 0.0005, prep = 
0.99). Including image attractiveness in a regression analysis revealed that 
attractiveness (~30%) and facial width ratio (~6%) independently explain variance in 
trust decisions (Model: R2 = 0.351, p < .0005, prep = 0.99, image attractiveness: B = 
4.65, p < .0005, prep = 0.99; facial width ratio: B = -2.48, p = .023, prep = 0.92).  
 
Figure 8-2 – Male facial width ratio predicts the proportion of participants that trust images. 
It is clear that male facial width ratio is a cue to male trustworthiness and that it 
predicts trust placed in male faces. What isn’t clear is that this ratio is driving trust 
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judgements because although we have excluded attractiveness as a correlate in our 
analysis it is possible that facial width ratio correlates with other facial cues. In 
experiment 3 we examined the effect of manipulating the facial width ratio of 
images on decisions to trust when other dimensions are held constant. 
Experiment 3 – Manipulation of Facial Images 
Participants 
Two hundred and eighty-six online participants (209 female; mean age = 23.2, s.d. 
4.4, range 18 - 35 years). 
Stimuli 
Using 3 different male image sets (n = 19; n = 36; n = 49; age range 18-27) collected 
at different times from different cohorts of students we made 3 prototypes of high 
and 3 of low facial width ratio faces to allow 3 facial width ratio transforms.  
Twelve male images were manipulated; each image was a composite of 3 facial 
photographs to mask identity for use in online experiments. These images were 
manipulated in shape (Rowland & Perrett, 1995) 25% up and 25% down (see Figure 
8-3) on each of the 3 facial width ratio transforms generating 3 pairs of images from 
each of the original 12 images  
The distribution of facial width ratio of the final 72 transformed images (12 base 
images x 3 transforms x 2 directions) did not differ from the facial width ratio 
distribution of the original image sets. 
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Figure 8-3 – Example of high ratio (right) and low ratio (left) transformed image. 
Procedure 
Participants were informed that they would be viewing multiple pairs of images and 
that they would be asked to a) decide which of each pair looked more trustworthy 
and b) complete a short questionnaire. Participants gave consent. 
Participants were randomly split into 3 groups and were presented with all 12 
identity pairs. Presentation of images was counterbalanced such that each 
participant saw all 12 identities using all 3 transforms; each participant group saw 
different identities matched with different transforms. The order of presentation of 
the 12 pairs of images was randomised as was whether the high or low manipulation 
of each pair was on the left or right side of the screen. 
Participants were given a forced choice to indicate which image of each pair looked 
more trustworthy.  
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Participants completed a short questionnaire including self-rated attractiveness and 
self-rated social dominance (from Puts, et al., 2006) on seven point Likert-type 
scales. 
Analysis 
For each participant the proportion of trust for high or low manipulations was 
calculated. There was no significant difference in decisions between the three 
participant groups in their mean responses (Kruskal-Wallis: df = 2, p = .95, prep = 
0.12), nor were there significant differences between participant mean responses to 
the 3 different manipulations (Friedman: N = 285, df = 2, p = .22, prep = 0.70). There 
was no significant difference in mean responses between male and female 
participants (Mann-Whitney: U208,77 = 8004.5, p = .99, prep = 0.04). We therefore 
pooled data across participant sex and groups and tested for a directional effect of 
image manipulation by chi-squared. 
Males and females differed in age (Mann-Whitney: U208,77 = 6315.5, p = .005, prep = 
0.97) and dominance (Mann-Whitney: U208,77 = 6316, p = .039, prep = 0.89) and were 
therefore split to test for  correlations between  trustworthiness judgements and 
other variables. 
Results and Discussion 
There were 120 participants who showed no bias or who more often chose the 
higher ratio image as more trustworthy and 165 participants who chose the lower 
ratio images as more trustworthy. Participants were significantly more likely to 
choose the lower ratio images as trustworthy (χ2 = 7.11, d.f. = 1, p < .005, prep = 0.97). 
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There were no significant correlations between male average choices and age, self-
rated dominance or self rated-attractiveness (all p > 0.61, prep < 0.43). There was, 
however, a significant negative correlation between female average choice of the 
low ratio and self-rated dominance (rs = -0.17, p = 0.018, prep = 0.93). There was no 
relationship between female trustworthiness judgements and self-rated 
attractiveness (p = 0.98, prep = 0.07) or age (p = 0.47, prep = 0.52). 
Male facial width ratio drives perceptions of trustworthiness especially for less 
dominant female evaluators. This result validated our interpretation of experiments 
2.  
Subordinate females may be more vulnerable to exploitative males and therefore 
pay more attention to their attributes in line with their interaction outcome 
dependency (Erber & Fiske, 1984).  
General Discussion 
Experiment 1 showed that the ratio of facial (bizygomatic) width to height predicts 
male reciprocation behaviour in Trust Games such that wider faced males are more 
likely to exploit trust than are slimmer faced males. In experiment 2 participants 
were less likely to trust male counterparts with wide rather than slim faces 
(independent of their attractiveness). Moreover, in experiment 3 manipulating face 
width with computer graphics controlled attributions of trustworthiness, particularly 
for subordinate female evaluators. 
These results clearly demonstrate that facial width to height ratio is used as a valid 
cue to trustworthiness. It is less clear how this cue has originated and is maintained.  
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Overgeneralization of emotion perception such that the similarity of an individual’s 
neutral expression to standard expressions such as anger or happiness may guide 
decisions whether to trust individuals (Montepare & Dobish, 2003; Oosterhof & 
Todorov, 2008). This would explain our results if a) higher facial width ratio males 
look angrier than lower ratio males and b) males with angry looking faces are 
disposed to greater exploitation of trust. Both of these hypotheses remain to be 
tested. 
Weston et al (2007) suggest that the sexual dimorphism in facial width ratio has 
resulted from sexual selection “operating mainly through mate choice.” Here 
females would have to favour wide faced males for reproduction. Explanations put 
forward explaining why male attractiveness (Takahashi, et al., 2006) and symmetry 
(Zaatari & Trivers, 2007) are negatively correlated with cooperation in economic 
games similarly derive from sexual selection. Better quality males need put on less 
cooperative display in order to attract female attention. Our data, however, shows 
that wide faced males are neither attractive nor trusted and are therefore 
inconsistent with female choice for wider faced males – although our experiments 
do not address mate choice directly. 
A second explanation put forward by Zaatari and Trivers (2007) for attractive, 
symmetric men being non-cooperative is that males with “superior ability…in 
situations involving aggression” should be less cooperative. This interpretation fits 
better with our data. Physical strength and fighting ability are apparent in male faces 
(Sell et al., 2009) and male facial width ratio has been suggested as a possible honest 
signal to dominance in male-male competition as it correlates with ratings of 
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propensity to reactive-aggression (Carré, McCormick, & Mondloch, In Press). While 
reactive-aggression (altruistic punishment in the point subtraction task) is pro-social 
we would interpret the validity of participant perceptions of anti-social 
untrustworthiness to derive from the same characteristic i.e. a robust physical build. 
Men with ‘robust’ wide faces may be able to both pro-socially punish and to anti-
socially exploit with relative impunity. The propensity to exploitative behaviour seen 
in our data appears to have created a generalized somewhat valid stereotypic 
association of wide facial structure with untrustworthiness.  
Finally, and contrary to Weston et al (2007) who argue that facial width ratio sexual 
dimorphism in skull shape may have been sexually selected by female choice in the 
hominid line, the data here suggests that female choice (indeed, partner choice in 
social contexts by both sexes) if it has had any effect in this aspect of human 
evolution has selected against, rather than for, this sexual dimorphism while 
variation may have been maintained through intra-sexual selection and competitive 
display between males. The decrease in sexual dimorphism and reduction of physical 
robustness accompanying hominid evolution may have facilitated the cooperation 
and trust that a functional human society demands.
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Section 3 Summary 
The existence of male-male competition effects in the Trust Game is evidenced in 
the following three ways: 1) Males that consider themselves to be physically 
dominant are more exploitative of other males. 2) The mean level of circulating 
testosterone in individuals predicts others responses (to both male and female 
images) such that facial cues associated with high testosterone elicit reduced trust 
but increased reciprocation from counterparts. 3) More aggressive and physically 
more robust males (as measured by facial width to height ratio) are more 
exploitative of trust and are seen as less trustworthy. We therefore conclude that 
Trust Game behaviour is modulated by intra-sexual competition. 
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Chapter 9  
 
Conclusion 
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Game theory predicts cooperation in a variety of context because various games 
have payoffs that are better for cooperative behaviour. If the context is best 
described as a Prisoner’s Dilemma then cooperative strategies will not survive for 
long but there are many situations that organisms find themselves in which are very 
different from this game and in which cooperation is the norm. Human behaviour is 
extremely cooperative and therefore the games we play are likely to be ones where 
it pays the individual to be cooperative, this thesis is an examination of one area of 
evolutionary thinking that suggests some explanations. 
Consideration of human behaviour from the point of view of evolution is not useful if 
our conclusions are merely post-hoc rationalisations or ‘just so’ stories. It has been 
cogently argued that the value of considering the relationship between human 
evolution and human behaviour is where it generates testable hypotheses about 
behaviour (Debruine, 2009).  
With regard to human altruism and trustworthiness the possible evolutionary 
sources are various. Game theory from the point of view of the genes allows kin 
selective thinking as it is likely that any organism that pays attention to and favours 
positive payoffs to others that share their genes will be an organism that will be 
replicated. This is therefore one source of cooperation and pursuing kin selective 
thinking has produced findings that self-similar looking human faces bias cooperative 
interactions. Participants favour those that look like themselves, or in other words, 
that look like kin but at the same time these participants do not find the self-similar 
opposite sex facial images to be more attractive (Debruine, 2002; Krupp, et al., 2008) 
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although same-sex faces may be more attractive if they are self-similar (Debruine, 
2004). 
The research presented in this thesis follows a similar logic and relates to another 
evolutionary source of cooperation, the requirement to reciprocate over successful 
reproduction; sexual selection. Organisms that have game payoff preferences such 
that their behaviour leads to offspring with better genes or resources are also 
organisms that will reproduce. Sexual selective thinking allowed the generation of 
hypotheses with regard to aspects of face perception, particularly attractiveness, in 
trusting and cooperative contexts.  
Sexual selection where reciprocity is required for successful reproduction leads to a 
mating market with a) inter-sexual competition; partner choice mechanisms 
(particularly female choice) leading to advertising behaviour (costly signalling) and b) 
intra-sexual competition (particularly male-male competition) but also to coercive 
behaviour or force aimed at altering market forces. 
With regard to partner choice we predicted that individual preferences in economic 
games would be to prefer interaction with facially attractive individuals; that males 
should advertise cooperation, particularly to attractive females, and that females 
should be attentive to these displays. We also predicted that individuals should 
evaluate their worth in the mating market and adapt their preferences accordingly. 
We saw the effect in Chapter 3 that while facial attractiveness is perceived as 
trustworthy (the ‘halo’ effect), female facial femininity (an attractive attribute 
related to sexual health) was trusted in excess of perceived trustworthiness. This 
result was followed up in Chapter 4 with evidence that males respond differently to 
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female than to male attractiveness such that they trust and reciprocate more with 
attractive females (over and above the attractiveness ‘halo’) and that this interacts 
with their self-report of whether they would win a physical fight with a same-sex 
peer i.e. their physical dominance such that less dominant males are more affected 
by female attractiveness. We interpreted this as male sexual advertising of altruism 
modulated by their own self-evaluation whereby more dominant males have less 
need to advertise in order to gain female attention. 
In Chapter 5 we reported that female participants also appear to respond to male 
behaviour as sexual advertising. While females show trust in line with the 
attractiveness (‘halo’) of their counterparts and reciprocate more with attractive 
female counterparts their reciprocation responses to male counterparts are 
negatively related to male attractiveness. This appears to be a reciprocal signal to 
the male display such that females keep their interaction with unattractive males on 
a reciprocal basis but exploit the ‘trust’ of (or accept the investment of) attractive 
males. This interpretation might be illustrated by a woman in a bar accepting a drink 
from an attractive man in exchange for a few minutes of conversation compared 
with rejecting the offer from an unattractive man and signalling lack of interest. We 
supported this interpretation with hypothetical dating preferences in Chapter 6 
where participants reported preferences exactly in line with mating market 
predictions. The results supported a mating market interpretation of the data as 
individuals of both sexes reported stronger preferences for the other to pay if they 
considered themselves to be more attractive i.e. rated themselves as high value in a 
mating market. Females, however, showed a stronger preference for males to pay 
for a meal than did males for females to pay. Also, while males were more likely to 
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prefer to pay if the female counterpart images were attractive, female participants 
showed even stronger preferences for the other to pay if the male image was 
attractive indicating that for these female participants accepting his payment would 
be a signal of interest in ongoing interaction.  
Our hypotheses that trust game behaviour is modulated by inter-sexual competition 
mechanisms were therefore supported. 1) Attractive individuals elicit more 
cooperation. 2) Male participants display trust and reciprocation toward attractive 
female counterparts in excess of perceived trustworthiness. 3) Female participants 
appear to respond to male trust as a signal of sexual interest and are therefore more 
likely to exploit the trust of attractive males. 4) In explicitly dating contexts females 
are more likely to prefer attractive males to pay for the meal.  
With regard to intra-sexual competition, we expected that amount of circulating 
testosterone would be relevant to male game play. We reported in Chapter 7 that 
male and female behaviour is related to the amount of circulating testosterone in 
their counterparts. Less trust and greater reciprocation is elicited by facial images of 
counterparts of both sexes with higher amounts of circulating testosterone 
(compared with lower), suggesting that level of aggression has a non-sex specific 
effect on cooperation. This effect is relevant to intra-sexual competition and the 
ability to acquire and hold on to resources but would also seem to be a general 
effect in both sexes and therefore may be indirectly relevant to sexual selection. 
As already mentioned, in Chapter 4 we reported that males who considered 
themselves to be more physically dominant were less affected by female 
attractiveness when making trust game decisions. This is indicative that males 
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evaluate their own mating market worth in contrast with their competition but is not 
clearly intra-sexual competition. In that chapter, however, we also reported an effect 
of male-male competition such that more physically dominant males were also more 
exploitative of other males than were less physically dominant males. 
In our final empirical report in Chapter 8 we discussed evidence for male signalling of 
physical dominance in the form of facial-width-to-height-ratio. This is a sexually 
dimorphic trait that relates to self-reports of dominance in males and is a cue to 
reactive-aggression (Carré & McCormick, 2008) and may be an honest signal of 
dominance or aggression similar to traits seen in other species such as antler size in 
roe deer (Vanpé et al., 2007). This cue did indeed relate to game play decisions and 
as reported in Chapter 8 was associated with untrustworthiness while it elicited less 
trust from others. We would conclude from this that males with higher facial width-
to-height ratio have, or have learned to have “superior ability in obtaining resources, 
especially in situations involving aggression” (Zaatari & Trivers, 2007) and therefore 
use this competence rather than cooperation. 
Our hypotheses that trust game behaviour is modulated by intra-sexual selection 
mechanisms of direct competition were therefore somewhat supported. 1) Male 
participants reporting an ability to win fights with same-sex peers are more 
exploitative of other males. 2) Cues to testosterone in counterpart’s faces are less 
trusted but elicit more reciprocation. 3) The male sexually dimorphic trait facial 
width-to-height ratio is related to self-report of physical dominance and to increased 
proportion of decisions to exploit others in the trust game while also being used by 
others as a cue to untrustworthiness. 
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There is, of course, a question of how these results generalise to other populations 
and the world at large. First the population sample is restricted. Second, there are 
issues with regard to framing that have not been addressed. 
The population sample has of necessity been restricted to the University of St 
Andrews and would therefore benefit considerable from replication at other sites. 
Chapter 7 in particular suffered from this problem as these experiments would be 
most convincingly be conducted with a large sample of male participants; this was 
unavailable in St Andrews. 
There are also issues with the framing of the experiments which have been hardly 
touched here. There are very many parameters of framing that can influence 
behaviour, such as whether a problem is described in terms of loss or gain (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986). More relevantly here, participants’ beliefs with regard to how real 
the games are can bias behaviour. While original experiments in the area of 
behavioural economics were consistently run with hypothetical situations 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and have since been shown to be consistent with real 
game behaviour it has also been shown that whether this is the case is sensitive to 
the exact structure and framing of games. For example while Gillis and Hettler (2007) 
report that participants in public goods games show the same behaviour whether it 
is played hypothetically or for real, in ultimatum games participant behaviour differs 
between these contexts. It is therefore an empirical question whether the results 
presented here, and particularly in Chapter 7, are due to similar framing effects. 
There may be framing effects throughout the experiments presented here which due 
to time and space have been left unaddressed. 
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With these provisos, we conclude that trusting and trustworthy behaviour in both 
sexes is biased by mating market considerations predicted by intra- and inter-sexual 
selection. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Experiment Instructions 1: 
“You and your partner start this game with £3 each. If you co-operate with each 
other and pool your resources (imagine a business enterprise) you can produce 
an extra £2. There is a catch though, only player 2 knows how to get the extra £2 
and so player 1 needs to loan all their money to get the advantage. 
“The game has two stages. In the first stage player 1 chooses whether to trust 
player 2 with the loan (the blue boxes in fig1) or to walk away (the green boxes). 
“If player 1 chooses not to trust player 2 both get what they started with i.e. £3 
each. 
“If player 1 chooses to trust then player 2 decides whether to run off with most 
of the cash or to distribute the gains evenly (blue or red boxes). 
“You will play this game a number of times. You will alternate between playing 
player 1 and player 2. You must decide whether to trust the individual you are 
playing with or whether to be trustworthy with them.” 
 
Experiment Instructions 2: 
“You will play a number of games. In each of these games it is possible to earn 
between £2 to £4. Unfortunately, we will not be able to pay you for every game 
but will rather select one of your games at random and pay you what you earn 
for that game. 
“In each game you will be allocated a counterpart. You will need to predict their 
possible behaviour in making a decision. You and your counterpart start this 
game with £3 each. The choice you face as Decision Maker 1 (DM1) is whether to 
give your money to them in trust.  
“If you pool your resources with theirs an extra £2 will be added. Your 
counterpart then makes a decision (as DM2) how to distribute the pooled 
money. For this game they can either distribute the gains evenly (You get £4 - 
Figure 1: blue box) or take the majority of the cash i.e. £6 (You get £2 - Figure 1: 
red box). 
“Otherwise you can decide not to pool resources and take £3 (Figure 1: green 
box). 
“You will play this game a number of times.” 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
 
Interface presented when participant is playing role 2: Decision whether to reciprocate trust. 
Participant makes a decision whether to reciprocate toward this face or not 
(or report that they recognise the face). 
 
 
Interface presented when participant is playing role 1: Decision whether to trust. 
Participant makes a decision whether to trust this face or not 
(or report that they recognise the face). 
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Interface presented when participant is not trusted when playing role 2: Participant reports 
that they recognise the face or continue to next game. 
 
